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OF PROSECUTORS AND PREJUDICE (OR “DO
PROSECUTORS HAVE AN ETHICAL OBLIGATION NOT
TO SAY RACIST STUFF ON SOCIAL MEDIA?”)
Alex B. Long*
INTRODUCTION
“Both the appearance and reality of impartial justice are necessary to
the public legitimacy of judicial pronouncements and thus to the rule of
law itself.”
- Williams v. Pennsylvania1
The past few years have seen numerous news stories about lawyers
posting racially inflammatory content on their social media accounts.2
While the phenomenon of lawyers posting online content manifesting racial
and other forms of bias is certainly not limited to prosecutors,3 most of the
media coverage has focused on prosecutors who have engaged in this type
of conduct. In 2016, a Florida prosecutor was fired after, among other
things, referring to downtown Orlando as “a melting pot of 3rd world
miscreants and ghetto thugs” on his Facebook page after a mass shooting.4
*

Williford Gragg Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of
Law. Thanks to Bruce Green, Cassandra Burke Robertson, Paula Schaefer, and Melanie
Wilson for their helpful comments and observations on an earlier draft. My thanks also to
Dalton Howard for his research assistance.
1
136 S. Ct. 1899, 1909 (2016).
2
See Kiley Thomas, Courtroom audio: Bradley County Judge Advises Client to Drop
Lawyer Over Racist Remarks, NEWS CHANNEL 9 (Aug. 21, 2019) (detailing racist and
homophobic
tweets
by
private
defense
attorney),
https://newschannel9.com/news/local/bradley-county-attorney-accused-of-making-racisthomophobic-comments-about-clients; Meet Todd Gee, Racist Lawyer in Tennessee, TORCH
NETWORK (July 29, 2019) (detailing posts by same attorney), https://torchantifa.org/meettodd-gee-racist-lawyer-in-tennessee/.
3
See Joe Patrice, Texas State Bar President Called Black Lives Matter A ‘Terrorist Group’
On Social Media, ABOVE L. (July 13, 2020 10:48 AM) (detailing controversy surrounding
unearthed social media post by president of State Bar of Texas),
https://abovethelaw.com/2020/07/texas-state-bar-president-called-black-lives-matter-aterrorist-group-on-social-media/.
4
See Tobias Salinger, Florida Prosecutor Fired over Facebook Post Following Pulse
Massacre Calling Downtown Orlando ‘a Melting Pot of 3rd World Miscreants and Ghetto
Thugs,’
N.Y.
DAILY
NEWS
(June
23,
2016,
6:41
PM),
https://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/prosecutor-fired-facebook-post-orlandomassacre-article-1.2685858.
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In 2018, the lead prosecutor in the San Bernardino County District
Attorney's Office gang unit was fired after referring to Representative
Maxine Water on social media as a “bitch” and a “loud mouthed c--- in the
ghetto [who] you think would have been shot by now.”5
The killing of George Floyd and subsequent protests during the
summer of 2020 resulted in several prosecutors losing their jobs or
otherwise facing public criticism for making inflammatory statements
online.6 In September 2020, a state assistant attorney in the criminal
prosecution division in Texas was fired for social media posts that, among
other things, referred to Black Lives Matter protesters as “terrorists,”
referred to Islam as a “virus,” and stated that “’trans people’ are an
5

See Alejandra Reyes-Velarde, San Bernardino County Gang Prosecutor Resigns After
Probe Into Social Media Rants, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 9, 2019, 11:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-michael-selyem-resigns-20190109story.html; Associated Press, Prosecutor Disciplined Over Profane Post About Maxine
Water,
FLA.
TIMES-UNION
(July
9,
2018,
10:19
PM),
https://www.jacksonville.com/news/20180709/prosecutor-disciplined-over-profane-postabout-maxine-waters. There are other examples. In a recent case from Tennessee, a
disciplinary prosecutor with the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility generated
some attention for several anti- Muslim Tweets. See Adam Tamburin, 'Anti-Muslim Bias'
of Tennessee Legal Ethics Watchdog Hurts Investigations, Court Filing Says, TENNESSEAN
(Dec. 11, 2020, 6:01 AM), https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/local/2020/12/11/antimuslim-bias-tennessee-legal-ethics-watchdog-spurs-investigation/6508034002/. In 2019,
an assistant prosecutor in Tennessee wrote on social media that white nationalists at the
Unite the Right march in Charlottesville were “good God-fearing patriots”. Daniel
Connolly, Collierville Assistant Prosecutor Mike Cross Praised White Nationalists, Court
Documents Say, MEMPHIS COMM APPEAL, (Mar. 18, 2019, 10:00 PM)
https://www.commercialappeal.com/story/news/2019/03/19/collierville-prosecutor-mikecross-white-nationalists/3103206002/.
In yet another case from Tennessee, Craig
Northcott, a district attorney in Tennessee, referred to Islam as “evil, violent, and against
God’s truth” in a Facebook post. See Adam Tamburin, Tennessee DA Won't Give Gay
Couples Domestic Assault Protections, TENNESSEAN, (June 5, 2019, 10:00 PM)
https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2019/06/05/tennessee-district-attorney-craignorthcott-wont-give-gay-couples-domestic-assault-;protections/1351851001/; Associated
Press, Tennessee DA Faces Investigation After Islam, Gay Comments, AP NEWS (June 10,
2019, https://apnews.com/article/d66b1405372b4daa9820c15a9a1d8996. .
6
See Debra Cassens Weins, Prosecuting Attorney Citicized for 'Racial Undertone' of
Facebook Comment, AM. BAR ASS’N J. (July 17, 2020, 11:05 AM) (detailing public
criticism of prosecutor who posted that “We can only hope the deadly [Covid-19] strain
spreads
in
riots”),
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/prosecuting-attorneycriticized-for-racial-undertone-of-facebook-comment; Gino Fanelli, Monroe County
Prosecutor Resigns After Post About George Floyd, WXXI News, (June 30, 2020)
(discussing resignation of prosecutor who posted on his Instagram account “7 funerals, a
golden casket, and broadcast on every major network for a man who was a violent felon
and career criminal? Soldiers die and the family gets a flag” on Instagram account),
https://www.wxxinews.org/post/monroe-county-prosecutor-resigns-after-post-aboutgeorge-floyd.
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abomination.”7 Another Texas prosecutor resigned after facing criticism for
a Facebook post that seemed to analogize Black Lives Matter protesters to
Nazis.8
There have also been several incidents in recent years in which
prosecutors have commented on matters of public concern on social media
in a way that is not overtly racist but nonetheless raises legitimate concerns
over the prosecutors’ integrity and appreciation of the special role that
prosecutors play. For example, in 2015 an assistant prosecutor resigned
after posting the message on Facebook following protests in Detroit
concerning the Freddie Gray killing: “So I am watching the news in
Baltimore and see large swarms of people throwing bricks etc at police who
are fleeing from their assaults... 15 in hospital already. Solution. Simple.
Shoot em. Period. End of discussion. I don't care what causes the protesters
to turn violent.”9
7

Eric Hananoki, A Texas Assistant Attorney General is a QAnon Conspiracy Theorist who
Tweets out Violent Threats and Bigoted Remarks, MEDIA MATTERS, (Sep. 3, 2020, 10:59
AM), https://www.mediamatters.org/twitter/texas-assistant-attorney-general-nick-moutosqanon-conspiracy-theorist-who-tweets-out; see also Rafael Olmeada, Prosecutor Fired
over Facebook Post Calling Demonstrators ‘Animals,’ SOUTH FLA. SUN SENTINEL, (June
1, 2020, 1:59 PM) (detailing prosecutor’s post following protests), https://www.sunsentinel.com/local/broward/fl-ne-prosecutor-fired-20200601v3qmqvb3kjciribqccsguyp4ee-story.html.
8
Jacey Fortin, Texas Prosecutor Resigns Over Facebook Post About Nazi Germany, N.Y.
TIMES, (June 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/29/us/kaylynn-williford-harriscounty-prosecutor-resign.html.
9
Elisha Anderson, Asst. Prosecutor Resigns after 'Shoot Em' Facebook Post, Detroit Free
Press, May 1, 2015,
https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/wayne/2015/05/01/assistant-prosecutorresigns-facebook-post/26709361/. In another situation, a deputy prosecutor in Idaho
generated controversy when he posted a response to a meme posted by a police officer.
The meme showed a white police officer standing in front of a police cruiser with text
reading, “[I]f we really wanted you dead all we'd have to do is stop patrolling your
neighborhood... and wait." The prosecutor posted the following comment in response:
“"Great point. Where the police are under attack from politicians, and the police become
less aggressive, the murder rates go up. I say, let them have their neighborhoods. They will
be like Rwanda in a matter of weeks." Deputy Prosecutor Says Facebook Post Poorly
Worded, Not Racist, Spokesman-Review, July 13, 2016,
https://www.spokesman.com/blogs/hbo/2016/jul/13/prosecutor-says-post-not-racist/ There
are other examples. See Associated Press, Florida Prosecutor Kenneth Lewis Sorry for
'Crack Hoes' Facebook Post, NBCNEWS.com, May 23, 2014,
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/florida-prosecutor-kenneth-lewis-sorry-crackhoes-facebook-post-n113196 (discussing Florida prosecutor who posted on Facebook that
“crack hoes” should “tie [their] tubes” and stated that Justice Sonia Sotomayor “hit the
quota lottery” when she was appointed to the Supreme Court and would be serving french
fries but for affirmative action); Debra Cassens Weins, Assistant US Attorney's Derogatory
Facebook Comments About 'Dalibama' and Trayvon Martin are Probed, ABA Journal,
Aug. 15, 2013,
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These incidents are troubling in isolation. But they are also troubling
insofar as they implicate broader concerns about how personal bias may
impact, or be perceived as impacting, a prosecutor’s professional conduct.
Bias may influence a prosecutor’s actions at multiple points in the criminal
process, ranging from the decision to charge a suspect to begin with to the
decision as to the crime charged to jury selection and ultimately to trial.10
As an example, a Tennessee prosecutor generated headlines when he
announced in a speech that he does not prosecute domestic violence claims
involving same-sex couples because he does not recognize the validity of
same-sex marriage.11
Concerns over the extent to which prosecutors bring their personal
biases into the courtroom have only increased in recent years and have
contributed to the doubts as to the overall fairness of the criminal justice
system, particularly as applied to people of color.12 One of the more
shocking examples of how prosecutor bias may impact the criminal justice
system occurred in September 2020 in the case of Francis Choy, an AsianAmerican woman previously convicted of murder. Choy’s 17-year-old
conviction was overturned, in part, due to the revelation that prosecutors
had exchanged emails containing “jokes about Asian stereotypes and
mocking caricatures of Asians using imperfect English.”13
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/assistant_us_attorneys_derogatory_facebook_co
mments_about_dalibama_and_tray (discussing federal prosecutor’s Facebook posts stating
that “low-information voters” were responsible for the election of the “Dalibama,” posting
a graphic stating “Obama: Why Stupid People Shouldn't Vote," questioning Trayvon
Martin’s actions on the day of his shooting, and noting and defense counsel’s decision to
seek delay of sentencing in a case that prosecuted in order to search for evidence of bias in
sentencing).
10
Am. Bar Ass’n Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function § 3-1.6 (4th ed.
2017) (prohibiting a prosecutor from using improper considerations in exercising
prosecutorial discretion).
11
See Tamburin, supra note 5.
12
See Rachel Cicurel, Don’t Stop with the Police: Check Racism in the Prosecutor’s
Office, WASH. POST (July 9, 2020, 4:33 PM) (referencing studies purporting demonstrate
prosecutor bias on the basis of race),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/07/09/dont-stop-with-police-checkracism-prosecutors-office/.
13
Deborah Becker, After Discovery of Prosecutors' Racist Emails, Plymouth DA Will Not
Seek New Trial for Woman over Parents Death, WBUR, (Sep. 29, 2020),
https://www.wbur.org/news/2020/09/29/prosecutors-racist-emails-plymouth-da-franceschoy; Michael Levenson, Judge Overturns Murder Conviction, Citing ‘Racial Animus’ in
Prosecutors’
Emails,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
1,
2020)
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/10/01/us/brockton-massachusetts-woman-freedprison.html. The judge in the case overturned the conviction on several grounds, including
the failure of prosecutors to turn over exculpatory evidence. Commonwealth v. Choy, No.
0383-CR-00300, at 16 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sep. 17, 2020) (Findings & Rulings),
https://d279m997dpfwgl.cloudfront.net/wp/2020/09/Decision-to-Vacate-Convictions.pdf.
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In most of the situations mentioned above, the prosecutors lost their
jobs, thus providing at least some minor measure of reassurance that their
superiors recognized the damage that such speech may have on the overall
perception of the impartiality of prosecutors and the fairness of the criminal
justice system.14 But while the news accounts of these incidents described
the statements at issue, the resulting public controversies, and the ensuing
adverse employment actions, rarely is there any mention of any violation of
the rules of professional conduct governing lawyers. Nor is there usually
any suggestion that the prosecutors in question might be subject to
professional discipline, up to and including disbarment.
That’s because, as this Article discusses, there is probably nothing
“unethical” about the conduct of the prosecutors in these cases as the law
exists in most jurisdictions. In many states, a prosecutor (or any lawyer)
who engages in harassment or discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or
other characteristics while in the course of representing a client or while
engaged in the practice of law may be subject to professional discipline.15
But no rule of professional conduct speaks directly to the situation in which
a prosecutor engages in such conduct in a private capacity. And, as
discussed in this Article, in most jurisdictions, it is unlikely that any rule
could be extended to reach this type of conduct.
Had the prosecutors mentioned above been judges rather than
prosecutors, they would have been subject to professional discipline,
including possible removal from the bench. The ABA Model Code of
Judicial Conduct (“CJC”) requires that a judge refrain from “activities that
would appear to a reasonable person to undermine the judge’s . . . integrity
or impartiality.”16 State judges have faced professional discipline for
violating this rule and similar rules for engaging in speech or conduct
manifesting bias on the basis of race, sex, or other characteristics while off
the bench and in their personal capacities.17 But as this Article discusses, it
With respect to newly-discovered emails, the judge concluded that the emails established
that “justice may not have been done and the convictions must be vacated.” Id. at 15-16.
14
For a discussion of the employment law and free speech aspects of these types of cases,
see Immanuel Kim, A Voice for One, or a Voice for the People: Balancing Prosecutorial
Speech Protections with Community Trust, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 1331 (2017).
15
See People v. Sharpe, 781 P.2d 659, 660 (Colo. 1989) (en banc) (publicly censuring
prosecutor who, during a conversation with defense counsel during a recess, said of the two
Hispanic defendants in death penalty case, “I don’t believe either one of those chili-eating
bastards”); infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
16
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 1.2, 3.1(C) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010) (emphasis
added).
17
See In re Ellender, 889 So.2d 225, 233 (La. 2004) (suspending judge who appeared at a
Halloween party wearing wig, black face makeup, and prison jumpsuit); Miss. Comm'n on
Judicial Performance v. Osborne, 11 So. 3d 107, 110, 118 (Miss. 2009) (suspending judge
who made racially-charged public speech); In re Eakin, 150 A.3d 1042, 1060 Pa. Ct. Jud.
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is unlikely that a prosecutor who posts racist, homophobic, or similar
material online or who otherwise engages in conduct or speech in an extraprosecutorial capacity that raises reasonable concerns about the prosecutors’
integrity and capacity to perform the functions of a prosecutor would be
subject to professional discipline.18
Simply stated, this Article argues that this is a mistake. More
specifically, the Article argues that, given the special role that prosecutors
occupy and the need to ensure the public that, to the extent possible, has
faith that the criminal justice system operates free from bias, the same rule
that requires judges to avoid extrajudicial activities that raise reasonable
concerns regarding the judge’s impartiality, integrity, and independence
should apply in the case of prosecutors.19 While the primary focus of this
Article is on online speech, this proposed rule would apply to extraprosecutorial speech and conduct more generally.
Part I of this Article discusses the special role that prosecutors play in
the criminal justice system and how their conduct may shape public
perception of the system. Part II surveys the rules of professional conduct
that might conceivably apply in the case of a prosecutor who engages in
extra-prosecutorial conduct that displays bias on the basis of race, sex, and
related characteristics or that otherwise raises concerns about the
prosecutor’s fitness for office. Part III examines the disqualification
standards that apply to prosecutors and notes the limited ability these
standards have to address extra-prosecutorial speech manifesting bias and
similar forms of speech. Part IV explores the rules outlined in the CJC that
apply to a judge’s extra-judicial activities that raise concerns over bias on
the basis of race, sex, and other characteristics. Finally, Part V identifies
the pros and cons of borrowing portions of the CJC for use in the regulation
of prosecution and argues that the same standard that applies to a judge’s
extra-judicial activities that raise a question about a judge’s impartiality and
integrity should apply to prosecutors.

Disc. 2016) (disciplining judge who exchanged e-mails with friends and professional
acquaintances that contained offensive material involving gender, race, sexual orientation,
and ethnicity); In re Lowery, 999 S.W.2d 639, 661 (Tex. Rev. Trib. 1998) (disciplining
judge for, inter alia, racial slurs directed at parking attendant).
18
For a discussion of some of the other ethical issues associated with a prosecutor’s use of
social media, see Emily Anne Vance, Note, Should Prosecutors Blog, Post, or Tweet?: The
Need for New Restraints in Light of Social Media, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 367 (2015).
19
As used in this Article, the term “prosecutor” would cover not only attorneys who
prosecute criminal cases but bar disciplinary counsel who perform prosecutorial functions.
See MODEL RULES FOR DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT Rule 4(B)(2) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2002)
(noting that bar counsel performs prosecutorial functions).
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I. THE SPECIAL ROLE OF PROSECUTORS AND PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
Prosecutors are partisans. Like all lawyers, prosecutors have a duty to
diligently represent their client’s interests, which frequently means
zealously advocating for a conviction.20 Some prosecutors focus heavily on
the partisan aspect of their jobs, viewing themselves as preparing to do
battle with defense counsel when they enter the courtroom.21
But of course, prosecutors are more than partisans. As representatives
of the sovereign, which has a compelling interest in achieving justice,
prosecutors have a duty to seek justice.22 As stated often in the law
governing lawyers, a prosecutor is a minister of justice.23 While
prosecutors are expected to act with zeal when they pursue a conviction,
they also must seek impartial justice, as free as possible from other

20

See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (stating that a prosecutor should
prosecute “with earnest and vigor”).
21
See Jeffrey Bellin, Theories of Prosecution, 108 CALIF. L. REV. 1203, 1232-33 (2020)
(noting the image of a prosecutor as a combatant and stating that “[u]nlike American
prosecutors, German prosecutors do not see themselves as white knights or avenging
angels”); Bruce Green, Why Should Prosecutors “Seek Justice?”, 26 FORDHAM URBAN L.J.
607, 642 (1992) (noting the prosecutor’s “instinct to do battle”); Daniel S. McConkie,
Structuring Pre-Plea Deal Discovery, 107 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 14 (2017)
(“[P]rosecutors work in an adversary system; they do battle against the defense to obtain
convictions.”); Ronald F. Wright & Kay L. Levine, The Cure for Young Prosecutors’
Syndrome, 56 ARIZ. L. REV. 1065, 1126 (2014) (stating that “young prosecutors begin their
careers thinking of themselves as superheroes, ready to try any case on the docket and to do
battle with any defense attorney who stands in the way of a conviction . . . .”); see also
State v. Medina, 604 A.2d 197, 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (“[P]rosecutors
cannot be expected to do battle in the adversarial ring with two hands tied behind their
backs.”); James R. Acker, Reliable Justice: Advancing the Twofold Aim of Establishing
Guilt and Protecting the Innocent, 82 ALB. L. REV. 719, 720 (2019) (stating that
“[c]riminal justice is rife with the vocabulary and imagery of institutionalized battle . . . .”).
22
See Berger, 295 U.S. at 88 (stating that “[i]t is as much [a prosecutor’s] duty to refrain
from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one”); People v. Herring, 20 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1076
(1993) (“A prosecutor is held to a higher standard than that imposed on other attorneys
because he or she exercises the sovereign powers of the state.”); Green, supra note 21, at
642 (stating that prosecutors’ duty to seek justice “derives from their role on behalf of a
sovereign whose own interest is in achieving justice”).
23
See, e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. McDonald, 85 A.3d 117, 144 (Md. 2014)
(stating that a prosecutor is “held to even higher standards of conduct than other attorneys
due to [the] unique role as both advocate and minister of justice”); MODEL RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 cmt. [1] (“A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of
justice and not simply that of an advocate.”) (Am. Bar. Ass’n 2020) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES].
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influences that may cloud their judgment.24 The ABA’s aspirational
Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function identify various
ways in which a prosecutor’s judgment might be clouded.25 The Standards
also specifically advise that a prosecutor should avoid bias or prejudice on
the basis of race and other characteristics in carrying out the prosecution
function and “should be proactive in efforts to detect, investigate, and
eliminate improper biases, with particular attention to historically persistent
biases like race, in all of its work.”26
Prosecutors play an important role in preserving public trust in the
criminal justice system. The public’s perception that the criminal justice
system operates in an unbiased manner is crucial to the operation of the
system.27 Where the process is tainted by real or reasonably perceived
prejudices, the public’s trust in the process is damaged. 28 As often noted,
the appearance of justice is as important as actual justice.29 Therefore,
prosecutors must strive not only for justice but the for the appearance of
justice.30
In this respect, prosecutors and judges occupy similar positions within
the criminal justice system. Both are representatives of the sovereign. As
24

State v. Medrano, 65 A.3d 503, 510 (Conn. 2013) (stating that a prosecutor is a
representative of the people, “who seek impartial justice for the guilty as much as for the
innocent”); AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION
FUNCTION § 3-1.7(f) (4th ed. 2017) (“The prosecutor should not permit the prosecutor’s
professional judgment or obligations to be affected by the prosecutor’s personal, political,
financial, professional, business, property, or other interests or relationships.”); Rebecca
Roiphe, A Typology of Justice Department Lawyers’ Roles and Responsibilities, 98 N.C. L.
REV. 1077, 1103 (2020) (stating that “prosecutors are asked to exercise substantial
discretion and are required to operate in a disinterested way”); Paul B. Spielman, Public
Prosecutors and the Appearance of Justice: How the Court of Appeals Erred in Gatewood
by Treating a State’s Attorney as an Ordinary Advocate, 65 MD. L. REV. 1222, 1222
(2006) (arguing that there is a “greater need for impartiality and disinterest by public
prosecutors due to their unique role as state advocates for justice”).
25
AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 31.7 (4th ed. 2017).
26
AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 31.6.
27
See Roberta K. Flowers, What You See is What You Get: Applying the Appearance of
Impropriety Standard to Prosecutors, 63 MO. L. REV. 699, 700 (1998) (“The appearance of
justice has been deemed as important as justice itself.”).
28
See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 628 (1991) (“Racial bias [within
the courtroom] mars the integrity of the judicial system and prevents the idea of democratic
government from becoming a reality.”).
29
See J.E.B. v. Ala. ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 161 n.3 (1994) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(“Wise observers have long understood that the appearance of justice is as important as its
reality.”); Richmond Newspapers, v. Va., 448 U.S. 555, 573–74 (1980) (plurality opinion)
(citing the common law notion that “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice’”).
30
See Flowers, supra note 27, at 703.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3794854

1-Feb-21]

PROSECUTORS AND PREJUDICE

9

such, they have the power to shape the public’s perception of the sovereign
and the system of justice the sovereign provides.31 Maintaining impartiality
and the appearance of impartiality are crucial components of a judge’s job.32
Obviously, a prosecutor’s conception of impartiality is different than that of
a judge, and laypeople certainly recognize that prosecutors play a partisan
role in judicial proceedings. But it is essential to the public’s trust in the
criminal justice system that members of the public believe that judges and
prosecutors make professional decisions free from improper influences.33
Unfortunately, there is considerable public distrust concerning the
criminal justice system. A 2019 survey by the National Center for State
Courts found that slightly less than half of respondents agreed with the
statement that courts are unbiased.34 The most alarming area of distrust is
that of race. A 2019 Pew Research Center survey found that a majority of
Americans believe that blacks are generally treated less fairly than whites
by the criminal justice system.35 Nearly 9 out of 10 black adults expressed
this view.36 Part of this mistrust may have to do with the shockingly low
number of elected black prosecutors.37 But recent history also suggests
strongly that some of this distrust is attributable to the perception that
prosecutors sometimes fail to prosecute police misconduct with sufficient
zeal.38 As the ABA Task Force on Building Public Trust in the American
31

See Flowers, supra note 27 at 732 (recognizing the symbolic role played by prosecutors
and their ability to undermine confidence in the justice system).
32
See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT R. 2.11(A) (stating that “[a] judge shall
disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might
reasonably be questioned”); Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56
HASTINGS L.J. 657, 661 (2005) (noting that federal judges take an oath of impartiality).
33
See Kate Levine, Who Shouldn’t Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1447, 1459
(2016) (“In order to maintain confidence in the court system, however, lawyers must
appear to be unconflicted in their zealous representation of a client.”).
34
GBAO STATE OF THE STATE COURTS—SURVEY ANALYSIS 3 (2020):
https://www.ncsc.org/__data/assets/pdf_file/0018/16731/sosc_2019_survey_analysis_2019
.pdf.
35
John Gramlich, From Police to Parole, Black and White Americans Differ Widely in
their Views of Criminal Justice System, PEW RES CTR, (May 19, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/05/21/from-police-to-parole-black-and-whiteamericans-differ-widely-in-their-views-of-criminal-justice-system/.
36
Gramlich, supra note 35; see also Joseph J. Avery & Joel Cooper, Racial Bias in PostArrest and Pretrial Decision Making: The Problem and a Solution, 29 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 257, 274 (2019) (“Many African-Americans distrust the criminal justice
system.”).
37
See I. Bennett Capers, Against Prosecutors, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 1561, 1600 & n. 214
(noting that prosecutors are “overwhelmingly white” and citing study showing that ninetyfive percent of all elected prosecutors are white).
38
See Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Racial Character Evidence in Police Killing Cases, 2018
WIS. L. REV. 369, 386 (2018) (“Prosecutors' failure to pursue charges, grand juries' failure
to indict, trial juries' failure to convict, and judges' light sentencing in police deadly force
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Justice System notes, “[t]hose concerns are heightened by the appearance
that the police officers and prosecutors handling misconduct allegations
have an institutional bias to exonerate accused officers.”39 One of the more
alarming recent incidents giving credence to these sorts of concerns is the
case of two St. Louis prosecutors who covered up the beating of a Black
suspect by a police officer and whose actions came to light shortly after the
Michael Brown shooting.40
A prosecutor’s social media activity or other forms of speech
manifesting bias on the basis of race or other characteristics only
contributes to public distrust of the criminal justice system. For example, in
the St. Louis case, not only did the prosecutors cover up police misconduct,
one of them made a racist and homophobic comment to a police detective
and another attorney when discussing the matter.41 As one of the lawyers
handling the ensuing disciplinary case against the prosecutor observed at
the time, the prosecutor’s statements called into question her ability to act
objectively in the performance of her official duties.42
Likewise, statements that are not overtly racist but that call into
question a prosecutor’s understanding of the special role of prosecutor and
the ability to carry out the obligations of the office also contribute to public
distrust of the system. When some of the prosecutors who engaged in this
type of activity in recent years have lost their jobs, their offices have
released statements announcing that the prosecutors’ actions were
inconsistent with their duties.43 But the social media posts undoubtedly did

cases have a significant impact on the American people and on the actual and perceived
legitimacy of our criminal justice legal system.”); AM. BAR ASS’N, TASK FORCE ON
BUILDING PUBLIC TRUST IN THE AMERICAN JUSTICE SYSTEM 19 (2017) (observing “that
many Americans perceive that the criminal justice system routinely permits police officers
to use excessive force against minorities with impunity” ”),
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/office_president/2_8_task_fo
rce_on_building_trust_in_american_justice_system.authcheckdam.pdf.
39
AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 34.
40
In re Schuessler, 578 S.W.3d 762 (Mo. 2019) (en banc).
41
Id. at 766.
42
See Jason Taylor, Missouri Supreme Court Considers Penalties for Cover Op of Police
Assault by St. Louis Circuit Attorneys, MISSOURINET, Jan. 24 2019 (quoting disciplinary
counsel as asking, ““How can we be sure that she’s going to objectively consider race and
sexual orientation in making her official charging duties?”),
https://www.missourinet.com/2019/01/24/missouri-supreme-court-considers-penalties-forcover-up-of-police-assault-by-st-louis-circuit-attorneys/.
43
See Olmeada, supra note 7 (quoting prosecutors’ office as saying “[t]he views expressed
in that posting are entirely inconsistent with the ideals and principles of the Broward State
Attorney’s Office and the duties and responsibilities of an assistant state attorney.”);
Salinger, supra note 4 (quoting supervisor as telling prosecutor that he could no longer
defend prosecutor “as a prosecutor free of bias”).
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damage to the credibility of the offices in question and contributed to the
continuing distrust of the criminal justice system in some quarters.
II. THE RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND EXTRA-PROSECUTORIAL
SPEECH MANIFESTING BIAS
The most obvious way the legal profession could address extraprosecutorial speech manifesting bias would be through the rules of
professional conduct governing lawyers. While most of the rules of
professional conduct regulate conduct occurring in a lawyer’s professional
capacity, there are already some rules that reach conduct occurring in a
lawyer’s private life.44 This Part of the Article discusses the rules that
might conceivably apply when a prosecutor engages in extra-prosecutorial
conduct that displays bias on the basis of race, sex, and related
characteristics or that otherwise calls into question a prosecutor’s fitness for
office.
A. Rule 3.8: Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor
The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the “Model Rules”)
recognize the special role that prosecutors play in the legal system by
devoting a rule entirely to the ethical responsibilities of prosecutors.45
Titled “Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor,” Model Rule 3.8
recognizes that a prosecutor is a “minister of justice whose duty is to seek
justice rather than merely to advocate for the State's victory at any given
cost.”46 Given this special role, the rule imposes special obligations on
prosecutors, such as the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the
defense and the duty to take steps to remedy a wrongful conviction.47 The
rule also imposes more stringent restrictions on public speech in the case of
prosecutors.48 But the rule only addresses prosecutor speech that is likely to
heighten public condemnation of “the accused.”49 Therefore, the rule does
44

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(b) (Am. Bar. Ass’n 2020) [hereinafter
MODEL RULES] (prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act that reflects adversely
on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects); id. R.
8.4(c) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation).
45
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.8 (Am. Bar. Ass’n 2020) [hereinafter MODEL
RULES].
46
Id. r. 3.8 cmt. 1.
47
Id. r. 3.8(d), (f).
48
Id. r. 3.8(f).
49
Id.
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not directly address extra-prosecutorial discriminatory statements that are
unrelated to any pending criminal matter. Indeed, the rule as a whole is
limited to prosecutor conduct “in a criminal case” and, therefore, does not
reach extra-prosecutorial conduct.50
B. Rule 8.4(g): Discrimination
Model Rule 8.4(g) prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct “that
the lawyer knows or reasonably should know is harassment or
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, national origin, ethnicity,
disability, age, sexual orientation, gender identity, marital status or
socioeconomic status in conduct related to the practice of law.”51 In
enacting the rule, the ABA recognized that “[d]iscriminatory and harassing
conduct, when engaged in by lawyers in connection with the practice of
law, engenders skepticism and distrust of those charged with ensuring
justice and fairness.”52 But by its terms, the rule is limited to discriminatory
conduct that is related to the practice of law. Many states have similar
versions of this rule, but they too are typically limited to situations in which
a lawyer is acting in the lawyer’s capacity as a lawyer or is acting in the
course of representing a client.53 Therefore, discriminatory conduct or
speech that occurs while a prosecutor is not wearing his or her metaphorical
prosecutor’s hat or that occurs away from the practice of law is not covered
by the rule.54
C. Rule 8.4(d): Conduct Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice
One potential basis for professional discipline for engaging in
discriminatory speech or conduct in one’s private capacity is Model Rule
8.4(d). The rule prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct prejudicial to
the administration of justice.55 The phrase “conduct prejudicial to the
administration of justice” is somewhat vague, and neither the rule nor the

50

Id.
Id. r. 8.4(d).
52
ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 493 (2020).
53
Compare NEB. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT § 3-508.4(d) (2020) (addressing conduct that
occurs when a lawyer is “employed in a professional capacity”) with COLO. RULES OF
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2020) (addressing conduct “in the representation of a client”).
54
See ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 493, 5 (2020)
(“Rule 8.4(g) does not regulate conduct unconnected to the practice of law, as do some
other rules of professional conduct.”).
55
MODEL RULE 8.4(d).
51
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comments provide further guidance as to what type of conduct the rule
prohibits. There are two competing judicial interpretations of the rule.56
1.

The Majority Approach

Under the clear majority approach, the rule is only applicable where the
misconduct has some bearing on the judicial process “in connection with an
identifiable case or tribunal.”57 Conduct is only actionable where it
“impedes or subverts the process of resolving disputes.”58 So, for example,
mishandling client funds might violate other rules, but because it ordinarily
does not interfere with the operation of the judicial process in an ongoing
matter, there is no violation of Rule 8.4(d).59 In contrast, filing a criminal
complaint against a judge in order to force the judge’s disqualification from
a matter would amount to a violation because it impedes the orderly
administration of the judicial process in a particular matter.60
The misconduct does not necessarily have to incur in the course of
representing a client under the majority approach. For example, the rule has
been applied when a lawyer lied under oath as part of an agency
investigation into the lawyer’s own conduct.61 But the misconduct must
still have occurred “in the course of some judicial proceeding or a matter
directly related thereto.”62
Prosecutors have faced professional discipline under this rule for a
variety of misconduct, including routinely issuing fake subpoenas in order
to interview witnesses,63 presenting false testimony in a capital case,64 and
allowing a victim to dictate as a condition of plea offer an amount of
restitution that would have exceeded what was allowed by statute.65 But it
56

See ABA ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (9th ed.2019) r. 8.4.
In re Mason, 736 A.2d 1019, 1023 (D.C.1999); see In re Discipline of Haderlie, 885
N.W.2d 78, 82 (N.D. 2016) (Crothers, J., specially concurring) (stating “the term has a
near-universal application to conduct connected with judicial proceedings”).
58
In re Friedman, 23 P.3d 620, 628 (Alaska 2001).
59
See id. at 629 (discussing this scenario).
60
See In re Aubuchon, 309 P.3d 886, 896 (Ariz. 2013) (involving this scenario).
61
In re Mason, 736 A.2d 1019, 1022-23 (D.C. 1999).
62
In re Smith, 848 P.2d 612, 613 (Or. 1993).
63
State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass'n v. Miller, 309 P.3d 108, 115 (Okla. 2013).
64
In re Peasley, 90 P.3d 764, 772 (Ariz. 2004) (en banc).
65
In re Flatt-Moore, 959 N.E.2d 241, 245 (Ind. 2012); see also In re Aubuchon, 309 P.3d
886, 896 (Ariz. 2013) (filing criminal complaint without probable cause); Matter of Miller,
677 N.E.2d 505, 508 (Ind. 1997) (prosecuting criminal charges against individual while
also assisting individual in civil claims); In re Bell, 72 So.3d 825, 827 (La. 2011)
(involving bribery); Disciplinary Counsel v. Spinazze, 149 N.E.3d 503, 506 (Ohio 2020)
(involving false statements to a court and attempt to cover up the misrepresentations with a
false notation in a case file and false excuses to supervisor); Disciplinary Counsel v.
57
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would be the rare case in which any lawyer’s discriminatory speech or
conduct would be actionable under this rule where the speech is not closely
connected to an ongoing matter. For example, in a Delaware case, a lawyer
sent a series of sexually crude and otherwise offensive emails to opposing
counsel.66 The Delaware Supreme Court held that while the conduct
violated the rule of conduct prohibiting a lawyer from using means that
serve no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay or burden a
person, the lawyer’s conduct was not prejudicial to the administration of
justice since there was no “showing that the conduct affected the
performance of opposing counsel or had some other distinct impact on the
judicial process.”67
2.

The Minority Approach

Some courts take a broader view of the language of Rule 8.4(d).68
Under this approach, an attorney’s conduct amounts to conduct prejudicial
to the administration of justice where the attorney's conduct “reflects
negatively on the legal profession and sets a bad example for the public at
large.”69 The concern for these courts is that the lawyer’s conduct
undermines the public’s trust in the legal profession or “engenders
disrespect for the courts and for the legal profession.”70
Given this more expansive reading of Rule 8.4(d), a lawyer’s conduct
may amount to a violation of the rule even where the conduct does not have

Phillabaum, 44 N.E.3d 271, 273 (Ohio 2015) (involving prosecutor who insisted that a
legal assistant add to an indictment gun specifications that had not been presented to the
grand jury and then signed the indictment); Disciplinary Counsel v. Phillabaum, 44 N.E.3d
271, 273 (Ohio 2015) (involving prosecutor who insisted that a legal assistant add to an
indictment gun specifications that had not been presented to the grand jury and then signed
the indictment); Disciplinary Counsel v. Wrenn, 790 N.E.2d 1195, 1197 (Ohio 2003)
(involving failure to disclose discoverable information).
66
Matter of Member of Bar Hurley, No. 383, 2017, 2018 WL 1319010, *3 (Del. Mar. 14,
2018).
67
Id.
68
See Florida Bar v. Frederick, 756 So.2d 79, 87 (Fla. 2000) (rejecting the idea that the rule
is limited to conduct in a judicial proceeding and holding that the rule covers “conduct that
prejudices our system of justice as a whole”); In re Waite, 782 N.W.2d 820, 824 (Minn.
2010) (stating that the court has never “limited the scope of conduct sanctionable under
Rule 8.4(d)” to conduct occurring before courts and other tribunals and upholding
discipline where lawyer failed to file tax returns); In re Bruner, 469 S.E.2d 55, 56 (S.C.
1996) (imposing discipline where attorney who misrepresented to client's title insurer that
requirement for insurance had been satisfied).
69
Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Brady, 30 A.3d 902, 913 (Md. Ct. App. 2011).
70
Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Dore, 73 A.3d 161, 175-76 (Md. Ct. App. 2013);
Attorney Grievance Comm'n of Md. v. Marcalus, 996 A.2d 350, 362 (Md. Ct. App. 2010).
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an adverse impact on the legal process in a particular matter.71 For
example, in a case from New York, a lawyer was found to have engaged in
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice when he made
threatening and racist phone calls to an African-American neighbor.72 In a
Maryland case, government attorneys at the Board of Veterans’ Appeals
had a longstanding practice of exchanging racist, homophobic, and
misogynistic emails during work hours, many of which concerned coworkers and work policies.73 The court found that the conduct amounted to
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice despite the fact that the
emails had no impact on any ongoing legal matter.74
For these courts, the fact that the lawyer in question is a prosecutor
may also be relevant in the determination of whether the prosecutor’s
conduct undermines public trust or engenders disrespect for the courts and
the legal profession. For example, in an Indiana case, a prosecutor faced
professional discipline after being arrested for driving under the influence.75
The Indiana Supreme Court found that the prosecutor had engaged in
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and publicly censured
the prosecutor.76 Central to the court’s decision concerning the violation of
the rule was the fact that the lawyer was a prosecutor:
The duty of prosecutors to conform their behavior to the law
does not arise solely out of their status as attorneys. As officers
charged with administration of the law, their own behavior has
the capacity to bolster or damage public esteem for the system.
Where those whose job it is to enforce the law break it instead,
the public rightfully questions whether the system itself is worthy
of respect. The harm done is to the public esteem for those
charged with enforcing the law.77
In an earlier decision, the Indiana Supreme Court had reached a similar
conclusion on a similar set of facts, analogizing the position held by a
prosecutor to that of a judge.78 Both are charged with administration of the
71
See In re Sitton, No. M2020-00401-SC-BAR-BP (Tenn. Jan. 22, 2001) (concluding
attorney violated rule when he gave advice on Facebook as a lawyer about planning in
advance how to claim a defense to killing someone).
72
In re Hennessey, 155 A.D.3d 1425, 1426 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
73
Attorney Grievance Comm’ v. Markey, 230 A.3d 942, 952-54 (Md. 2020).
74
Id.; see also In re Disciplinary Action against Gherity, 673 N.W.2d 474, 476
(Minn.2004) (disciplining lawyer who was convicted of battery and disorderly conduct).
75
Matter of Seat, 588 N.E.2d 1262, 1262-63 (Ind. 1992).
76
Id. at 1264. Interestingly, the court concluded that the prosecutor had not violated the
rule of professional conduct prohibiting a lawyer from committing a criminal act that
reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other
respects. Id.
77
Id.
78
In re Oliver, 493 N.E.2d 1237, 1242 (Ind. 1986).
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law, so both have the ability to bolster or damage the public perception of
the justice system.79 Accordingly, in Indiana, “criminal conduct committed
by prosecutors or their deputies is conduct inherently prejudicial to the
administration of justice.”80
D. Disciplinary Rule DR 1–102(A(6): Conduct that Reflects Adversely on
One’s Fitness to Practice Law
A handful of states retain a provision from the older Model Code of
Professional Responsibility (the “Model Code”) that might conceivably
apply in situations in which a prosecutor exhibits bias in the prosecutor’s
private capacity. Under Disciplinary Rule (DR) 1–102(A)(6), a lawyer who
engages in conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice
law is subject to professional discipline.81 Today, nearly every jurisdiction
has abandoned use of the older Model Code and instead base their rules of
professional conduct on the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
Under the Model Rules, a lawyer who commits a criminal act that reflects
adversely on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law is subject to discipline.82
Thus, the Model Rule is narrower than the older Model Code rule.
However, a few states have retained the language of DR 1-102(A)(6) in
their rules.83
This rule prohibiting conduct that adversely reflects on the lawyer’s
fitness to practice law is a catch-all rule that, in theory, applies when no
other rule addresses the conduct in question.84 Despite this, disciplinary
authorities sometimes charge lawyers with violations of the rule and courts
uphold discipline under the rule when the conduct clearly violates other
rules.85 Like the rule prohibiting conduct that is prejudicial to the
79

Id.
Matter of Hill, 144 N.E.3d 184, 193 (Ind. 2020).
81
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A)(6)(AM BAR ASS’N 1969).
82
MODEL RULES r. 8.4(b).
83
See ALABAMA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2020); KANSAS RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT r. 8.4(g) (2020); MASSACHUSETTS RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(h) (2020);
NEW YORK RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(h) (2020); OHIO RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT
Rule 8.4(h) (2020); WASH. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(n) (2020); see also COLO.
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(h) (prohibiting a lawyer from engaging “in any conduct
that directly, intentionally, and wrongfully harms others and that adversely reflects on a
lawyer's fitness to practice law”).
84
See In re West, 805 P.2d 351, 354 (Alaska 1991) (stating rule only addresses conduct not
already listed under other provisions).
85
For example, in Alabama State Bar v. Giardini, No. 1180248, 2020 WL 2298363, *8
(Ala. May 8, 2020) a prosecutor who was responsible for prosecuting child sex abuse cases
was charged with a violation of the rule for engaging in sexually explicit online
conversations with teenagers. This conduct clearly violated Rule 8.4(b), which prohibits an
80
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administration of justice, the language of the rule raises its own set of
vagueness concerns.86 However, the rule has withstood various challenges
on the grounds that it is unconstitutionally vague.87
The rule has been applied in a host of scenarios, including conduct
unrelated to the practice of law.88 Notably, disciplinary authorities have
charged lawyers with violations of this rule for making racist statements,
both while acting as lawyer and in situations completely unrelated to the
practice of law.89 The fact that the lawyer in question is a prosecutor has
also been a factor in the decision to impose professional discipline in some
instances.90 Therefore, it is not out of the question that the rule could apply
in the case of a prosecutor or other lawyer who engages in racist or other
forms of discriminatory speech in a private capacity. But, again, few states
have such a rule in place.
III. PROSECUTOR DISQUALIFICATION STANDARDS

attorney from committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on a lawyer’s honesty,
trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.
86
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §5, cmt. c (AM. Las
INST. 2000) (stating that “the breadth of [catch-all] provisions creates the risk that a charge
using only such language would fail to give fair warning of the nature of the charges to a
lawyer respondent and that subjective and idiosyncratic considerations could influence a
hearing panel or reviewing court in resolving a charge based only on it”).
87
See, e.g., Norris v. Alabama State Bar, 582 So.2d 1034, 1037 (Ala. 1991); In re
Holtzman, 78 N.Y.2d 184 (1991).
88
See, e.g., People v. Zeilinger, 814 P.2d 808 (Colo. 1991) (en banc) (involving sexual
relations with a client); People v. Robinson, 839 P.2d 4 (Colo. 1992) (en banc) (involving
prosecutor’s use of cocaine); Butler County Bar Association v. Blauvelt, 156 N.E.3d 891,
893 (Ohio 2020) (involving lawyer charged with public indecency); Matter of Bernstein,
237 A.D.2d 89 90-92 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. A.D. 1997) (involving lawyer with a history of
making sexually suggestive statements to clients). For an empirical study on how states
that retain this provision actually apply it in practice and the types of misconduct for which
attorneys have been disciplined under the rule, see Jon J. Lee, Catching Unfitness, __ GEO.
J.L. ETHICS ___, *49-59 (forthcoming 2021).
89
See People v. Sharpe, 781 P.2d 659, 660-61 (Colo.1989) (disciplining prosecutor under
the rule who used racial slurs during a court recess); Matter of Schlossberg, Case No. 202003248, 2020 WL 7550464, *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. A.D. Dec. 22, 2020) (censuring lawyer who
made racist statements while berating a store employee).
90
See Robinson, 839 P.2d at 6 (“The respondent, however, undertook an even higher
responsibility to the public with respect to this obligation by virtue of his public office as
an attorney engaged in law enforcement.”); People v. Sharpe, 781 P.2d 659, 660-61
(Colo.1989) (stating “a sanction is necessary in order to emphasize that lawyers, especially
those acting as public officials, must scrupulously avoid statements as well as deeds that
could be perceived as indicating that their actions are motivated to any extent by racial
prejudice.”).
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The Francis Choy case mentioned in the Introduction, in which a
murder conviction was overturned, in part, due to the discovery of racist
emails exchanged between the prosecutors in the case, illustrates the point
that sometimes the existence of prosecutorial bias renders it impossible for a
neutral observer to have faith in the possibility of an impartial trial.91 One
way the legal system may address prosecutor bias is through
disqualification motions. As the following Part discusses, courts apply
different disqualification standards when it comes to prosecutorial bias. But
regardless of which standard a court uses, disqualification of prosecutors is
uncommon.
A. Prosecutor Bias as a Conflict of Interest
The classic conflict of interest scenario arises when a lawyer’s exercise
of independent professional judgment is compromised by some external
consideration.92 Most lawyers think of professional conflicts of interest in
terms of a lawyer’s conflicting loyalties between clients.93 But the rules of
professional conduct also make clear that a conflict may arise from a
lawyer’s own personal interests.94 Where, for example, a client has called
into question a lawyer’s professional conduct during the course of
representation, it may be that the lawyer’s own self-interest or animosity
toward the client may limit the ability of the lawyer to dispassionately
consider or recommend an appropriate course of action on behalf of the
client.95 In such cases, a lawyer would have a conflict of interest under

91

See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.1.7 cmt. [8] (“[A] conflict of interest exists if
there is a significant risk that a lawyer's ability to consider, recommend or carry out an
appropriate course of action for the client will be materially limited as a result of the
lawyer's other responsibilities or interests.”).
93
See generally id. r. 1.7(a)(2) (explaining that conflicts may arise as a result of a lawyer’
responsibilities to another client); id. R 1.8(a) (restricting a lawyer’s ability to enter into
business transactions with a client).
94
See id. r. 1.7(a)(2) (explaining that conflicts may arise where the representation of a
client is materially limited by a lawyer’s own interests).
95
See In re Toney, No. 09–61830, 2012 WL 1854259, *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio May 21,
2012) (noting that animosity between the client and attorney may lead to representation
being materially limited by the attorney's personal interests); Or State Bar Ass’n, Formal
Op. 2009-182 (explaining that a conflict may exist because it is “possible that Client’s
filing of a Bar complaint could create such personal resentment that it would compromise
Lawyer’s ability to effectively represent Client”); see also Mannhalt v. Reed, 847 F.2d
576, 581 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that when “an attorney is accused of crimes similar or
related to those of his client, an actual conflict exists because the potential for diminished
effectiveness in representation is so great”).
92
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ABA Model Rule 1.7(a)(2) because the lawyer’s representation of the client
would be materially limited by the lawyer’s personal interests.96
A lawyer’s strongly-held views, biases, or personal animosity may
result in a disqualifying conflict of interest.97 This principle applies to
prosecutors as it does all lawyers.98 For example, the ABA’s Criminal
Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function observe that a prosecutor
“should not permit the prosecutor’s professional judgment or obligations to
be affected by the prosecutor’s personal” interests.99 While professional
disciplinary action against a prosecutor is rare,100 the idea that a
prosecutor’s personal biases or animosity may result in a conflict of interest
that improperly influences a prosecutor’s charging decision to the point that
the conflict amounts to a violation of the rules of professional conduct has
occasionally found its way into disciplinary decisions.101
Potentially disqualifying conflicts involving a prosecutor’s personal
biases may take a variety of forms. Several authors have argued that a
disqualifying conflict of interest exists when prosecutors are called upon to
prosecute police officers, prosecutors’ “closest professional allies.102 Close
96

MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r.1.7(a)(2).
See Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 125 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST.
2000) (“[A] conflict may also result from a lawyer's deeply held religious, philosophical,
political, or public-policy beliefs.”); see also People v. Doyle, 406 N.W.2d 893, 897-98
(Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (stating that one category of prosecutor conflict cases “includes
situations where the prosecuting attorney has a personal interest (financial or emotional) in
the litigation, or has some personal relationship (kinship, friendship or animosity) with the
accused”). See generally State v. Hatfield, 356 N.W.2d. 872, 875-76 (1984) (“Personal
animosity on the part of the prosecuting attorney toward the defendant of such a degree that
it was likely to color the prosecutor's judgment as to whether to prosecute, or would cause
such attorney to make highly inflammatory and prejudicial statements to the court during
trial, may be sufficient to cause a conviction to be set aside.”); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Racial
Antagonism, Sexual Betrayal, Graft, and More: Rethinking and Remedying the Universe of
Defense Counsel Failings, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 57, 94 (2019) (noting racial animosity on
the part of defense counsel as grounds for new trial).
98
See Bruce A. Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Rethinking Prosecutors’ Conflicts of Interest, 58
B.C. L. REV. 463, 466-67 (2017) (explaining that a prosecutor’s conflict may arise “out of
any personal belief” and discussing how implicit bias may impact prosecutor discretion).
99
AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION, § 31.7. (f) (4th ed. 2017).
100
See Green & Roiphe, supra note 98, at 485 (“Prosecutors are rarely disciplined for
anything, much less conflicts of interest.”).
101
See In re State Bar of Ariz. v. Thomas, PDJ-2011-9002, 233–46 (Ariz. Apr. 10, 2012),
http://archive.azcentral.com/ic/news/0410Thomas-Aubuchon.PDF; Bruce A. Green &
Samuel J. Levine, Disciplinary Regulation of Prosecutors as a Remedy for Abuses of
Prosecutorial Discretion: A Descriptive and Normative Analysis, 14 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
143, 160 (2016) (discussing case).
102
Levine, supra note 30, at 1450; see John V. Jacobi, Prosecuting Police Misconduct,
2000 WIS. L. REV. 789, 804 (arguing that prosecutors have “an impossible conflict of
97
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working relationships between prosecutors and the police play a critically
important role in enabling prosecutors to obtain convictions.103 Given this
reality, some scholars have argued that prosecutors face a disqualifying
conflict when they are called upon to prosecute police officers.104
Ordinarily, the concern in a conflict of interest situation is that the
lawyer in question will be less zealous in the representation of a client.105
But sometimes the opposite may true; bias may potentially cause a
prosecutor to be overly zealous. For example, various studies suggest racial
bias impacts prosecutors’ charging and plea bargain decisions.106 The
ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards for the Prosecution Function specifically
caution prosecutors against allowing impermissible considerations, such as
race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation, gender
identity, or socioeconomic status, to influence a prosecutor’s discretion.107
A prosecutor’s racial or other bias may present a significant risk that that
the prosecutor’s independent professional judgment will be compromised,
thus resulting in a violation of the rules of professional conduct if the
prosecutor remains involved in the matter.108
If the lawyer in question were not a prosecutor, there would be no real
concern about overzealousness on the part of a lawyer. But, of course,
prosecutors are different. Ultimately, a prosecutor’s job is to see that justice
interest” in such cases); Caleb J. Robertson, Comment, Restoring Public Confidence in the
Criminal Justice System: Policing Prosecutions When Prosecutors Prosecute Police, 67
EMORY L.J. 853, 856–57 (2017) (arguing that prosecutors face “an unavoidable apparent
conflict of interest in such circumstances”).
103
See Jacobi, supra note 96, at 803–04 (noting the essential role that police officers play
in the work of prosecutors and stating that “prosecutors face ‘an impossible conflict of
interest between their desire to maintain working relationships and their duty to investigate
and prosecute police brutality’”) (quoting Alexa P. Freeman, Unscheduled Departures: The
Circumvention of Just Sentencing for Police Brutality, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 677, 719 (1996));
Levine, supra note 102 at 1469-70 (“Maintaining a good relationship with individual
officers and the good will of a police department is essential to a prosecutor's success in
obtaining convictions, and thus to her professional life.”).
104
See Levine, supra note 102 at 1484-85.
105
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cousin, 88 N.E.3d 822, 837 (Mass. 2018) (noting that
defense counsel had a conflict of interest where his ability to zealously represent client
could have been hampered by conflicting loyalties); Veronica J. Finkelstein, Better Not
Call Saul: The Impact of Attorneys on their Clients’ Sixth Amendment Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 1215, 1245 (2015) (noting that conflicts pose a
challenge to an attorney’s ability to zealously advocate for a client’s interests).
106
See Cicurel, supra note 12 (citing studies).
107
AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION,
Standard 3-1.6 (4th ed. 2017).
108
See generally Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Prosecutorial Neutrality, 2004 WIS.
L. REV. 837, 853 (2004) (“A prosecutor who is unable to exclude impermissible racial,
gender, or religious considerations from her discretionary decision-making, or who is
predisposed to give weight to these considerations, lacks neutrality.”).
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is done.109 A prosecutor who is strongly prejudiced against a criminal
defendant may allow that prejudice to cloud the prosecutor’s judgment as a
minister of justice. The prosecutor’s representation of the client–-the
public110–-may therefore be materially limited by the prosecutor’s bias, to
the detriment of the accused and the public.111
B. Conflicting Prosecutorial Disqualification Standards, Infrequent
Disqualification
There are several reasons why a prosecutor’s demonstrated bias may
not lead to disqualification in a given matter. First is the fact that the rules
of professional conduct and disqualification standards are not always the
same in some jurisdictions.112 While a violation of a rule of professional
conduct involving conflicts of interest may subject a lawyer to professional
discipline, it does not always automatically lead to the disqualification of
that lawyer in a matter.113 Courts must ultimately decide if the concerns
over a lawyer’s conflict of interest are substantial enough to disqualify a
lawyer, thereby depriving the lawyer’s client of chosen counsel.114 Another
reason to not rely heavily on disqualification motions as a means of
addressing prosecutor bias is simply that judges are often hesitant to grant
such motions.115 This reluctance may be explained out of a judicial concern
over removing a duly appointed or elected public official or out of a
concern of imputing the conflict to the prosecutor’s entire office.116
109
See Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 71 (2011) (“The role of a prosecutor is to see
that justice is done.”).
110
See AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION,
§ 3-1.13 (4th ed. 2017) (stating that a prosecutor “generally serves the public and not any
particular government agency”).
111
See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 204 A.3d 326, 351 (Pa. 2018) (Donohue, J., opinion in
support of reversal) (stating in the case of a judge who sent racist emails to prosecutors that
the defendant was entitled to a prosecutor “whose judgment is neither ‘clouded’ nor
‘blurred by subjective reasons’”).
112
See Woods v. Covington Cty. Bank, 537 F.2d 804, 810 (5th Cir. 1976) (stating that
consideration of whether disqualification is required encompasses more than the rules of
professional conduct).
113
See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 1304, 1314 (5th Cir. 1995)
(noting that while the rules of professional conduct concerning conflicts “provide a useful
guide for adjudicating motions to disqualify, they are not controlling”).
114
See Woods, 537 F-2d at 810 (noting the needs to strike a balance between the need to
ensure ethical conduct and other interests, such as protecting a litigant’s “right to freely
chosen counsel”).
115
See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88
GEO. L.J. 207, 241 n.173 (2000) (noting the reluctance of courts to disqualify prosecutors).
116
See Zacharias & Green, supra note 109. (“It is one thing to exhort government lawyers
to avoid appearances of impropriety; it is another thing, through the exercise of supervisory
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In addition, even where a court uses the standard articulated in the rules
of professional conduct as the disqualification standard, it may be difficult
to establish that the standard is met. For example, it may be difficult to
establish that a lawyer’s biases are so pronounced that they actually create a
significant risk that the representation of a client will be materially
limited.117 But in the case of prosecutor bias, the public’s perception that
impartial justice cannot be done is deeply troubling by itself.118
In the case of prosecutors in particular, courts have developed their
own standards for disqualification. Some courts state that the appearance of
impropriety sometimes justifies disqualification of a prosecutor.119 But
courts that recognize this possibility also often note that they decide such
matters on a case-by-case basis and emphasize that that it is the “rare”
situation in which the mere appearance of impropriety is sufficient to justify
disqualification of a prosecutor.120 Under this approach, the appearance of
authority over the conduct of licensed attorneys, to remove duly appointed (or elected)
government officials from office.”). Where the general rule is that one lawyer’s conflict is
imputed to the other lawyer’s in the office, there is a real concern about disqualifying an
entire prosecutor’s office based on the conflict of one prosecutor. See State v. Camacho,
406 S.E.2d 868, 875 (N.C. 1991) (noting the government’s interest in fulfilling its
prosecution function and the interest in convenience in using the local prosecutor’s office);
Green & Roiphe, supra note 98, at 488 (noting the difficulty of applying the imputed
disqualification rule to an entire office).
117
See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868, 883 (2009) (noting the difficulties
of inquiring into actual bias); State v. Detroit Motors, 163 A.2d 227, 231 (N.J. Super Ct.
Law Div.1960 (noting that “in any given case, except a very unusual one, it would not be
possible for the defendant to prove” improper intent or motive on the part of a prosecutor).
118
See People v. Greer, 561 P.2d 1164, 1172 (Cal. 1977) (stating that “both the accused
and the public have a legitimate expectation that his zeal, as reflected in his tactics at trial,
will be borne of objective and impartial consideration of each individual case”); People v.
Doyle, 406 N.W.2d 893, 898-99 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (recognizing that the two policy
considerations in prosecutor disqualification matters are fairness to the accused and “the
preservation of public confidence in the impartiality and integrity of the criminal justice
system”).
119
See Battle v. State, 804 S.E.2d 46, 51 (Ga. 2017) (“Certainly, a conflict of interest or the
appearance of impropriety from a close personal relationship with the victim may be
grounds for disqualification of a prosecutor.”); State v. Lemasters, 456 S.W.3d 416, 423
(Mo. 2015) (stating that disqualification is required “if a reasonable person with knowledge
of the facts would find an appearance of impropriety and doubt the fairness of the trial”);
Doyle, 406 N.W.2d at 899 (“American courts have consistently held that the appearance of
impropriety is sufficient to justify disqualification of a prosecuting attorney.”). But see
People v. Paulitch, No. 337949, 2018 WL 3594456, *8 (Mich. Ct. App. July 26, 2018)
(holding that the appearance of impropriety standard is no longer applicable in prosecutor
disqualification situations). Numerous authors have called for a disqualification standard
for prosecutors that employs an “appearance of justice” or “appearance of impropriety”
standard. See Levine, supra note 33 at 1462; Robertson, supra note 102, at 861;
120
Bogle v. State, 655 So.2d 1103, 1106 (Fla. 1995); People v. Adams, 987 N.E.2d 272,
274 (N.Y. 2013).
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impropriety justifies disqualification only in those situations in which “the
appearance is such as to discourage public confidence in our government
and the system of law to which it is dedicated.”121 Numerous courts take
the position that a party must show the existence of an actual conflict or
actual impropriety before disqualification of a prosecutor is appropriate.122
Others have adopted something of a middle ground, finding that
disqualification is appropriate where the presence of an actual or apparent
conflict “renders it unlikely that defendant will receive a fair trial.”123
Regardless of the disqualification standard employed, the
disqualification of a prosecutor is rare.124 One study of all federal
disqualification decisions in criminal cases over a ten-year period found
exactly zero cases in which a court disqualified a prosecutor.125 Thus, the
reality is that reliance on the threat of disqualification to curb prosecutorial
bias is unlikely to yield meaningful results.126
121

Adams, 987 N.E.2d at 274; see also Liapis v. Dist. Ct., 282 P.3d 733, 737 (Nev. 2012)
(stating that the appearance of impropriety is only sufficient to justify disqualification in
the case of a public attorney and then only “if the appearance of impropriety is so extreme
as to undermine public trust and confidence in the judicial system”).
122
See People in Interest of N.R., 139 P.3d 671, 675 (Colo. 2006) (noting that the
legislature had done away with the “appearance of impropriety” standard as a basis for
disqualifying a district attorney”); Commonwealth v. Breakiron, 29 A.2d 1088, 1092 (Pa.
1999) (applying an actual impropriety standard); Commonwealth v. Eskridge, 604 A.2d
700, 702 (Pa. 1992) (stating that disqualification is appropriate where “an actual conflict of
interest affecting the prosecutor exists in the case”); State v. McManus, 941 A.2d 222,
231–32 (R.I. 2008) (“Courts that have considered this issue typically hold that a prosecutor
should be disqualified if there is an actual conflict of interest.”); Levine, supra note 102, at
1454 (stating that courts usually hold that an appearance of impropriety is insufficient to
justify disqualification of a prosecutor). Courts also regularly apply an actual conflict
standard on post-conviction motions based on a prosecutor’s alleged conflict. See State v.
Medina, 713 N.W.2d 172, 182 (Wis. Ct. App. 2006) (concluding that “actual conflict of
interest” standard applied to post-trial claim based on failure to disqualify prosecutor);
Monu Bedi, Unraveling Unlawful Command Influence, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 1401, 1433
(2016) (stating that the appearance of impropriety is insufficient to warrant relief).
123
People v. Conner, 666 P.2d 5, 8 (Cal. 1983) (en banc). This standard replaced the
previous standard in California under which disqualification is appropriate when a
prosecutor has a conflict that “might prejudice him against the accused and thereby affect,
or appear to affect, his ability to impartially perform the discretionary function of his
office. People v. Greer, 561 P.2d 1164, 1173 (Cal. 1977) (emphasis added).
124
See Zacharias & Green, at 241 n.173 (2000) (noting the reluctance of judges to
disqualify prosecutors); Keith Swisher, Disqualifying Defense Counsel: The Curse of the
Sixth Amendment, 4 ST. MARY'S J. LEGAL MALPRACTICE. & ETHICS 374, 397 (2014)
(noting the difficulty criminal defendants face in seeking disqualification of prosecutors).
125
Swisher, supra note 124, at 397.
126
See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judicial Impartiality in a Partisan Era, 70 FLA. L.
REV. 739, 774-75 (2018) (stating questioning the ability of recusal motions to address
judicial bias).
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IV. THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND JUDICIAL BIAS
The judiciary has had its own issues in recent years concerning
extrajudicial speech manifesting bias on the basis of race and other
characteristics.127 The most disturbing example is undoubtedly the case of
Judge Richard Cebull, a federal judge in Montana, who sent hundreds of
offensive emails displaying bias on the basis of race, sex, religion, and
sexual orientation to friends and professional contacts over the course of a
several year period.128 The Code of Judicial Conduct’s treatment of a
127

See Devlin Barrett, Judge Forced Off Bench After Online Posting of Noose, ‘Make
America Great Again’ Message, WASH. POST (Sep. 17, 2019 10:48 AM) (detailing judicial
misconduct proceedings and resignation of judge who posted an image of a noose on his
Facebook page), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/judge-forced-offbench-after-online-posting-of-noose-make-america-great-againmessage/2019/09/17/29baa094-d954-11e9-ac63-3016711543fe_story.html; Lateshia
Beachum, A Judge Resigns After Using the N-Word in Texts that She Says the Public was
Never Meant to See, SEATTLE TIMES (Feb. 27, 2020, 1:46 PM) (detailing account of judge
who sent racist texts to a romantic partner),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/02/27/jessie-leblanc-resigns-racial-slur/. In
2019, the Tennessee Board of Judicial Conduct found that Judge James Lammey had not
made anti-Semitic statements on Facebook when he reposted an article by a Holocaust
denier that called Muslim immigrants “foreign mud” and suggested that Jews should “get
the F--- over the Holocaust.” Daniel Connolly, Memphis Judge Posts Facebook Link to
Holocaust Denier's Essay Calling Immigrants ‘Foreign Mud,’ MEMPHIS COMM APPEAL
(Apr. 30, 2019, 5:00 AM),
https://www.commercialappeal.com/story/news/2019/04/30/memphis-judge-facebook-jimlammey-posts-holocaust-denier-article-tennessee/3335613002/; Tennessee Board of
Judicial Conduct, Letter of Reprimand, (Nov. 15, 2019),
http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/docs/lammey_reprimand_letter_only_2019_11
_18.pdf. The Board did, however, reprimand the judge for violating the Code of Judicial
Conduct by sharing items on Facebook that reflected, among other things,
a concern for the credibility of certain federal agencies, a strong position on
professional athletes kneeling during the national anthem, the effect of illegal
aliens on the economy, opposition to certain Democrat platform principles,
opposing support for then-presidential candidate Hillary Clinton, a position on
Black Lives Matter and the double standard of the news media, a position on the
controversial issue of shooting deaths by police officers and the media bias, antiJihadist sentiment, a position on the controversial issue of transgender bathrooms
and boys in girls’ locker rooms, concern for illegal aliens voting in Virginia, and
an expression of bias in favor of then-presidential candidate Donald Trump.
Letter of Reprimand, supra; Debra Cassens Weiss, Judge Who Shared ‘Foreign Mud’
Article on Facebook is Reprimanded for Partisan Posts, ABA J. (Nov. 20, 2019, 4:39
PM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/judge-who-shared-foreign-mud-articleon-facebook-is-reprimanded-for-partisan-posts.
128
See Matt Volz, Federal Judge Sent Hundreds of Bigoted Emails, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
(Jan. 27, 2014), https://apnews.com/article/0a3b4ee6fc3340b8aac612202ee264aa. The
Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference originally found Cebull’s conduct violated the Code of
Judicial Conduct and ordered a public reprimand, but later vacated the order as moot before
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judge’s extrajudicial activities giving rise to a perception of bias is fairly
extensive, at least when compared to the treatment of prosecutorial bias in
the rules of professional conduct.129 In addition, the Code of Conduct for
United States Judges, a separate ethics code applying to federal judges, also
addresses the same issues. The following Part examines the CJC’s handling
of judicial bias, including its handling of extrajudicial conduct giving rise to
the perception of racial and other forms of bias, as well as the treatment of
the issue by the Code of Conduct for United States Judges and the federal
statute authorizing discipline in the case of misconduct on the part of
federal judges.
A. The CJC’s Treatment of Judicial Bias in General
The CJC recognizes that judges owe numerous duties to the public.130
Judges owe duties of “independence” and “integrity.”131 They also owe a
duty of “propriety,” not just in the sense of conduct that complies with the
law and other external regulations but in the sense of competent, diligent,
and unbiased performance of a judge’s judicial duties.132 Rule 2.1 of the
CJC announces that a judge’s performance of judicial duties take
precedence over all of the judge’s personal or extrajudicial activities.133
Thus, the CJC prohibits a judge from engaging in extrajudicial activities,
like serving as a partner or employee of a business entity, that may take a
judge’s time and attention away from the performance the judge’s
performance of judicial duties.134

it became public due to Cebull’s subsequent retirement. Eventually, the Committee on
Judicial Conduct and Disability of the Judicial Conference of the United States ordered the
publication of the report. In re Judicial Misconduct, 751 F.3d 611 (Judicial Conference of
the United States Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability 2014).
129
Canon 3 of the CJC is devoted entirely to personal and extrajudicial activities that may
conflict with the obligations of the judicial office.
130
See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology (AM. BAR. ASS’N 2010) (stating
that the judicial office is a public trust).
131
Id. Canon 1 (“A judge shall uphold and promote the independence, integrity, and
impartiality of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety.”).
132
Id. Terminology (defining “impropriety” in terms of “that violates the law, court rules,
or provisions of this Code, and conduct that undermines a judge’s … impartiality”); id.
Canon 2 (stating that a judge “hall perform the duties of judicial office impartially,
competently, and diligently”).
133
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.1.
134
See id. r. 3.11(B) (prohibiting a judge, with certain exceptions, from serving as an
officer, director, manager, general partner, advisor, or employee of any business entity).
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But the Code also recognizes that a judge’s own biases may also
interfere with the proper performance of the judge’s judicial duties. “Proper
performance” of judicial duties, by definition, includes the impartial
performance of those duties.135 The CJC defines “impartiality” in terms of
the ability to maintain an open mind and the lack of bias or prejudice in
favor of, or against, a particular class of persons.136 The concept of
impartiality appears repeatedly through the CJC, from the rules regarding
judicial disqualification to the rules regarding making pledges, promises, or
commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial performance of
judicial duties.137 Of the four judicial duties that Canon 1 articulates a
judge as owing to the public–-independence, integrity, propriety, and
impartiality–-impartiality (or the absence of bias or prejudice) is the duty
the rules and canons reference most frequently.138
In addition to the lack of actual bias or prejudice, judges must avoid
conduct that creates the appearance of bias or prejudice. In order for the
public to have confidence in the independence, integrity, and propriety of
the judiciary as a whole, the public must have faith that judges are
performing their duties free from bias or prejudice.139 Thus, when the CJC
speaks of the need for judges to perform their duties in a manner free from
bias or prejudice, the rules also frequently reference the need for the public
to be able to reasonably believe that bias or prejudice concerning an

135

See id. r. 2.2 (“A judge shall uphold and apply the law, and shall perform all duties of
judicial office fairly and impartially.”).
136
Id. Terminology.
137
Id. r. 2.11; id. r. 2.10.
138
Relying on the mention of a word in a rule or canon is perhaps not the best way to
measure the frequency with which the CJC addresses a concept. For example, Rule 2.15
references a judge’s “honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a judge.” Id. r. 2.15. These are
all terms that might arguably fall under either the category of “integrity” or “proper”
behavior (or perhaps both). The word “independence” does not appear in Rule 3.4,
prohibiting a judge from accepting appointments to governmental committees. But a
comment explains that the rule furthers the goals of independence and impartiality.
Therefore, reliance on the canons and black-letter rules may not yield a complete picture.
But, by my count at least, the concept of “impartiality,” including reference to the absence
of “bias” or “prejudice,” appears 13 times in the CJC, almost twice as much as any of the
other terms.
139
See generally id. Preamble ¶ [2] (stating that judges “should aspire at all times to
conduct that ensures the greatest possible public confidence in their independence,
impartiality, integrity, and competence”); id. r. 2.3 cmt. 1 (“A judge who manifests bias or
prejudice in a proceeding impairs the fairness of the proceeding and brings the judiciary
into disrepute.”)
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individual or an entire class of people were not factors in the judge’s
actions.140
For example, Rule 2.3(A) of the CJC requires a judge to perform the
duties of the judicial office without bias or prejudice. 141 Judicial conduct
organizations typically apply the rule to the situation where a judge’s
conduct displays a preference for one side or the other, irrespective of race
or similar considerations.142
B. The CJC’s Treatment of Extrajudicial Speech or Conduct Manifesting
Bias
The CJC contains three rules that might potentially speak to the
situation in which a judge’s extrajudicial conduct manifests bias on the
basis of race or other characteristics.
1.

The Appearance of Impropriety Standard

The first is Rule 1.2, the “appearance of impropriety” rule. Canon 1 of
the CJC articulates the principle that a judge “shall avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety.”143 Rule 1.2 then announces the enforceable
rule: “A judge shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public
confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary,
and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.”144 A
comment emphasizes that “[p]ublic confidence in the judiciary is eroded by
improper conduct and conduct that creates the appearance of impropriety”
and that “[t]his principle applies to both the professional and personal
conduct of a judge.”145
The “appearance of impropriety” language has a long history in the
Code of Judicial Conduct and has survived several revisions to the code.146
An earlier version of the rule, which is still in place in some jurisdictions,
140

See id. r. 2.11(A) (“A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in
which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to
the following circumstances . . . .”).
141
Id.
142
See In re Cresap, 940 So.2d 624, 635 (La. 2006) (concluding judge violated rule where
he failed to remain neutral and “essentially aligned himself with the plaintiffs”).
143
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010).
144
Id. r. 1.2.
145
Id. Canon 1 cmt. [1].
146
See Nancy J. Moore, Is the Appearance of Impropriety an Appropriate Standard for
Disciplining Judges in the Twenty-First Century, 41 LOY U. CHI. L.J. 285, 285-88 (2010)
(discussing history of the standard).
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existed in the form of a broad, hortatory Canon 2(A), requiring that judges
avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety at all times.147 A
comment explained that the focus should be on “whether the conduct would
create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge's ability to carry out
judicial responsibilities with integrity, impartiality and competence is
impaired.”148 The current CJC definition of “impropriety” likewise focuses,
in part, on “conduct that undermines a judge’s independence, integrity, or
impartiality.”149 Each of these terms, in turn, has its own definition.150
Depending on the jurisdiction, judges who engage in conduct reflecting
racial and other forms of bias or prejudice potentially face discipline under
either version of the CJC for having engaged in conduct that creates the
appearance of impropriety. For example, Judge Richard Cebull, the federal
judge from Montana mentioned earlier who used his court email account to
send hundreds of offensive emails was found to have engaged in conduct
that created the appearance of impropriety.151 Similarly, in a 2016 case
from Pennsylvania, a Supreme Court justice used his government-supplied
computer and email server to send and receive e-mails that contained nudity
and inappropriate references involving gender, race, sexual orientation, and
ethnicity, including several sexually suggestive emails about court
personnel.152 The Pennsylvania Court of Judicial Discipline considered
whether this conduct violated the “appearance of impropriety” canon.153 In
considering whether the justice’s conduct violated the canon, the court
observed that the canon applied not only to a judge’s “decision-making
duties’ but a judge’s “off-bench” conduct as well.154 In this particular
instance, the court classified the judge’s conduct as “on-bench” misconduct
insofar as the judge used government-supplied equipment to send the
material.155 The court concluded that the judge’s conduct “could cause
citizens to wonder whether their cases received unbiased consideration by”
the judge and that “a reasonable inference was that the judge lacked the
impartiality required of judges.”156 Such conduct “fundamentally lessens

147

MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2(A) cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1990).
Id.
149
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology (Am. BAR ASS’N 2010).
150
Id.
151
See supra note 128 and accompanying text; In re Judicial Misconduct, 751 F.3d 611, 62
(Judicial Conference of the United States Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability
2014).
152
In re Eakin, 150 A.3d 1042, 1060 (Pa. Ct. Jud. Disc. 2016).
153
Id. at 1055.
154
Id. at 1056-57.
155
Id. at 1057.
156
Id. at 1058.
148
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public confidence in the judiciary” and, therefore, violated Pennsylvania’s
Code of Judicial Conduct.157
Judicial conduct commissions have also applied the “appearance of
impropriety” standard in situations in which a judge’s conduct has nothing
to do with the judge’s official duties.158 In re Ellender involved a judge
who attended a Halloween part wearing a prisoner jump suit, handcuffs, an
“afro wig,” and blackface.159 The Judiciary Commission of Louisiana
charged the judge with a violation of the same version of the “appearance of
impropriety” canon as in the Pennsylvania case.160 In finding that the judge
had violated the rule, the court referenced the importance that “justice is
dispensed to every citizen, without fear of bias or prejudice.”
2.

Rule 2.3(B)

The second rule that might apply in the case of a judge’s out-ofcourt conduct suggesting bias on the basis of race or other characteristics is
CJC Rule 2.3(B). Rule 2.3 generally requires that judges perform their
judicial duties without bias or prejudice.161 In particular, Rule 2.3(B)
provides that
A judge shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words
or conduct manifest bias or prejudice, or engage in harassment,
including but not limited to bias, prejudice, or harassment based
upon race, sex, gender, religion, national origin, ethnicity,
disability, age, sexual orientation, marital status, socioeconomic
status, or political affiliation . . . .162
On its face, the rule applies to conduct occurring in the performance of
the judge’s official duties, and this is the situation in which courts and
judicial conduct commissions have applied the rule.163 But some courts
have applied the rule in a situation in which a judge makes statements or
engages in conduct about the judge’s duties but not while performing those

157

Id.
See In re Lowery, 999 S.W.2d 639, 661 (Tex. Rev. Trib. 1998) (disciplining judge for,
inter alia, racial slurs directed at parking attendant).
159
In re Ellender, 889 So.2d 225, 227 (La. 2004).
160
See id. at 228
161
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.3(A) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010).
162
Id. r. 2.3(B).
163
See, e.g., State v. Bowser, 474 P.3d 744 (Kan. 2020) (involving judge who allegedly
abandoned his neutral role and referenced defendant’s race while encouraging defendant to
accept plea deal); In re Day, 413 P.3d 907 (Or. 2018) (involving judge who set up
screening process in order to avoid having to perform same-sex marriages).
158
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duties.164 In re Neely is a judicial discipline case from Wyoming involving
a municipal court judge who told a reporter that she would not perform
same-sex marriages due to her religious beliefs.165 The Wyoming
Commission on Judicial Conduct and Ethics subsequently brought
disciplinary charges against the judge for violation of several rules of
judicial conduct, including a violation of Wyoming’s version of Rule 2.3(B)
and eventually recommended the judge’s removal from the bench.166
In reviewing the Commission’s decision, the Wyoming Supreme Court
noted that a comment to Rule 2.3 explained that a judge must avoid conduct
that may reasonably be perceived as prejudiced or biased.167 While the
judge denied that her statement manifested any actual bias toward
homosexuals, in the court’s view, her statement could reasonably be
perceived as doing so.168
3.

Rule 3.1(C)

While the “appearance of impropriety” standard and Rule 2.3(B) have
been applied to extrajudicial speech and conduct manifesting racial bias,
Rule 3.1(C) speaks most directly to such conduct. Rule 3.1(C) provides that
a judge shall not participate in extrajudicial activities “that would appear to
a reasonable person to undermine the judge’s independence, integrity, or
impartiality.”169 A comment explains that “[d[iscriminatory actions and
expressions of bias or prejudice by a judge, even outside the judge’s official
or judicial actions, are likely to appear to a reasonable person to call into
question the judge’s integrity and impartiality.”170 The comment mentions
“jokes or other remarks that demean individuals” on the basis of race and
these other characteristics as the sort of speech that might reasonably call
into question a judge’s integrity or impartiality.171 Rule 3.1(C) is a new
addition to the CJC, but shares some similarities with the “appearance of
impropriety” standard from the older version of the CJC.172
164
See Tennessee Board of Judicial Conduct, Letter of Reprimand, Nov. 15, 2019,
http://www.tsc.state.tn.us/sites/default/files/docs/lammey_reprimand_letter_only_2019_11
_18.pdf.
165
390 P.3d 728, 734 (Wyo. 2017).
166
Id. at 751. The judge was also charged with violation of Rule 1.1 (compliance with the
law), 1.2 (appearance of impropriety), and 2.2 (fairness and impartiality). Id. at 747-50.
167
Id. at 751 (quoting MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 2.2 cmt. 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2010).
168
Id.
169
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 3.1(B) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010).
170
Id. r. 3.1 cmt. [3].
171
Id.
172
See supra notes 139-140 and accompanying text (discussing appearance of impropriety
standard).
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C. The Code of Conduct for United States Judges and Judicial Bias
Finally, it is worth noting the treatment of these issues by the Code of
Conduct for United States Judges and the federal statute that establishes the
complaint procedure for judicial misconduct. As its name suggests, the
Code of Conduct applies to federal judges.173 Although organized
somewhat differently, the Code largely tracks the CJC. So, for example,
Canon 1 of both codes require a judge to maintain high standards of conduct
in order to uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary.174 In
Judge Cebull’s case, the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference found that the
judge had violated this provision of the Code by sending his racist emails.175
In Cebull’s case, the Judicial Conference also found that the judge’s
conduct satisfied the standard for discipline for judicial misconduct. 29
U.S.C. § 351 authorizes the investigation of complaints of judicial
misconduct on the part of federal judges. The statute provides that any
person alleging conduct prejudicial to the effective administration of the
business of the courts may file a complaint, which then triggers a review of
the complaint by the chief judge of the circuit.176 The process may
ultimately lead to professional discipline.177 This same “conduct prejudicial
to the effective administration of the courts” appears in several state
constitutions as well and has been applied in the case of extrajudicial
conduct.178 In Judge Cebull’s case, the Ninth Circuit Judicial Conference
found that the judge’s emails amounted to conduct prejudicial to the
effective administration of justice and warranted public reprimand.179

173

CODE OF CONDUCT FOR UNITED STATES JUDGES Introduction (2019).
Id. Canon 1 (“A judge should maintain and enforce high standards of conduct and
should personally observe those standards, so that the integrity and independence of the
judiciary may be preserved.”); MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT (“A judge shall uphold
and promote the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary …”).
175
In re Judicial Misconduct, 751 F.3d 611, 623 (Judicial Conference of the United States
Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability 2014).
176
29 U.S.C. §§ 351(a), 352(a).
177
Id. § 354.
178
See Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission of Virginia v. Pomrenke, 806 S.E.2d 749,
754-55 (Va. 2017) (finding that judge who violated canons of judicial conduct by
attempting to influence witnesses in wife’ criminal trial had engaged in conduct prejudicial
to the proper administration of justice); In re Jones, 800 So.2d 828, 830 (La. 2001) (finding
judge’s battery upon another judge violated canons of judicial conduct and amounted to
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into
disrepute).
179
In re Judicial Misconduct, 751 F.3d at 624.
174
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V. APPLYING THE LESSONS OF THE CJC’S TREATMENT OF JUDICIAL BIAS TO
THE SPECIAL CASE OF EXTRA-PROSECUTORIAL SPEECH
The rules of professional conduct governing lawyers serve multiple
functions. They establish standards of conduct in an effort to provide
guidance for lawyers.180 They also serve as the basis for the lawyer
disciplinary process, which punishes misconduct and deters future
misconduct.181 But they serve other purposes as well. The rules also
articulate fundamental values of the legal profession.182 Thus, the rules
serve an expressive function by making a statement to the profession and
the public at large as to the fundamental principles of the profession and
what forms of conduct it considers unacceptable.183 In order to send a
message to the public and to deter prosecutors from engaging in extraprosecutorial conduct that creates the appearance of bias or otherwise calls
into question a prosecutor’s impartiality or fitness or the office, the ABA
and states should borrow from the approach of the Code of Judicial Conduct
and amend their rules of professional conduct governing lawyers address
the issue.
A. Lessons for Prosecutor from Judicial Ethics

180

See Robert J. Kutak, Report of the Commission on Evaluation of Professional
Standards, 107 A.B.A. ANN. REP. 828, 828 (1982) (stating that one purpose of the project
to rewrite the rules of professional conduct was to provide “realistic, useful guidance for
lawyer conduct”).
181
See Fred C. Zacharias, The Purposes of Lawyer Discipline, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV.
675, 698 (2003) (listing deterrence as one of the functions the professional disciplinary
process).
182
See Kutak, supra note 164 (stating that another purpose of the project to rewrite the
rules of professional conduct “was to produce rules of professional conduct that preserve
fundamental values”).
183
See David L. Hudson, Jr., Conduct Unbecoming, ABA J. (Oct. 1, 2020) (quoting
Professor Leslie Levin as saying of Rule 8.4(g) that “the rule signals that [discriminatory]
conduct is not tolerated by the profession,” and “should help deter some of that behavior”),
https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/opinion-helps-define-the-reach-and-scopeof-aba-model-rule-84g; Veronica Root Martinez, Combating Silence in the Profession, 105
VA. L. REV. 805, 855 (2019) (“Similar to formal laws, rules of professional conduct can
also serve an expressive function.”). Gary A. Munneke, Dances with Nonlawyers: A New
Perspective on Law Firm Diversification, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 559, 601 (1992) (stating
that the rules “represent a philosophy, and, moreover, an expression of what it means to be
a lawyer”); W. Bradley Wendel, Nonlegal Regulation of the Legal Profession: Social
Norms in Professional Communities, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1955, 2052 (2001) (“From a
sociological standpoint, ethics rules perform the function of bolstering the public image of
the profession …”).
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As one court observed, “Judges who freely use racial or other epithets,
on or off the bench, create, at the very least, a public perception that they
will not fairly decide cases involving minorities.”184 The rules regarding
disqualification of judges are based on the maxim that “justice must satisfy
the appearance of justice.”185 Ultimately, judicial legitimacy depends on
the public’s perception of judicial impartiality.186
The same logic applies to prosecutors. Given the power and influence
prosecutors have over the operation of the criminal justice system and the
public scrutiny that their jobs entail, the perception that a prosecutor’s
professional judgment may be clouded by bias has the potential to damage
confidence in the fairness of the system.187 Therefore, it makes sense to
subject prosecutors to standards of conduct similar to those that apply to
judges when that conduct may influence public perceptions of impartiality
and integrity.
This would not be the first instance in which the law recognized the
similarities between judges and prosecutors in terms of their decisionmaking processes. Courts have frequently referred to a prosecutor’s role as
being “quasi-judicial” in nature.188 Judges enjoy absolute immunity from
tort liability stemming from the performance of their judicial duties.189
Prosecutors also typically enjoy absolute immunity based on the courts’
recognition of the fact that prosecutors acting in their official capacity act in

184

In re Lowery, 999 S.W.2d 639, 656-57 (Tex. Rev. Trib. 1998).
See Levine, supra note 33, at 1457 (“The maxim that ‘justice must satisfy the
appearance of justice’ is central to the Supreme Court's due process rulings on judicial
disqualifications …”).
186
See Moore, supra note 146, at 291 (stating that judges must avoid the appearance of
impropriety “because public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality of
the judiciary is critical to the public's willingness to accept judicial decision-making and
submit to the rule of law.”); Robertson, supra note 126, at 740 (“Public faith in the
impartiality of our courts is the bedrock of American democracy and the rule of law.”).
187
Paul B. Spielman, Public Prosecutors and the Appearance of Justice: How the Court of
Appeals Erred in Gatewood by Treating a State’s Attorney as an Ordinary Advocate, 65
MD. L. REV. 1222, 1248 (2006) (“[A]nything affecting a prosecutor's impartiality can have
a significant impact on a defendant's right to a fair trial and on public confidence in the
fairness of the trial.”).
188
See, e.g., Ganger v. Peyton, 379 F.2d 709, 714 (4th Cir. 1967) (“The prosecuting
attorney is an officer of the court, holding a quasi judicial position …”); Griffin v. U S, 295
F. 437, 439 (3d Cir. 1924) (“The United States Attorney and his assistants are officers of
the court, holding quasi judicial positions.”); State v. Boyd, 233 S.E.2d 710, 717 (W. Va.
1977) (“This Court has uniformly held that a prosecuting attorney occupies a quasi-judicial
position in the trial of a criminal case.”).
189
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 656 (AM. LAW INST. 1977) (“A public
prosecutor acting in his official capacity is absolutely privileged to initiate, institute, or
continue criminal proceedings.”).
185
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a “quasi-judicial” capacity.190 The policy justifications for extending this
form of immunity to prosecutors center on the need to preserve a
prosecutor’s independent judgment and the need to preserve the public trust
in that judgment.191 Without protection from potential tort liability,
prosecutors might fear retaliation for exercising discretion as to whether to
charge a defendant and how to prosecute that charge.192 Immunity is
therefore necessary to protect the prosecutor’s ability to exercise that
discretion in good faith and to preserve public trust in the good faith
exercise of that discretion.193 Courts have offered the same justifications
for extending immunities to judges in the performance of their official
duties.194
In order to further the public’s trust in the impartiality of the criminal
justice system, prosecutors should be under an obligation similar to that of
judges in terms of extra-prosecutorial behavior that casts reasonable doubt
on a prosecutor’s impartiality or integrity. This, of course, does not mean
that the rules of conduct for prosecutors and judges should be identical in
terms of their regulation of off-duty conduct.195 There are limits to the
similarities between judges and prosecutors. But the similarities between
them are sufficiently strong to warrant treating them similarly in terms of
speech or conduct that leads to reasonable concerns over impartiality.

190

See, e.g., Brown v. Dayton–Hudson Corp., 314 N.W.2d 210, 214 (Minn.1981) (holding
that assistant city attorney enjoyed quasi-judicial immunity) ); Creelman v. Svenning, 410
P.2d 606, 607 (Wash. 1966) (recognizing immunity for prosecutors, “acting as [they do] in
a quasi-judicial capacity”).
191
See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 514-15 (1978) (recognizing the importance of
preserving independent judgment in the case of hearing officers and analogizing such
individuals to prosecutors); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 424-25 (1976) (justifying
immunity, in part, on the need to preserve public trust in the prosecutor’s office).
192
See Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.1949) (“[I]t has been long decided
that it is better to allow a few wrongs to go unredressed than to expose all prosecutors to
the risk of retaliation for their occasional honest mistakes.”).
193
See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 425 (“The public trust of the prosecutor's office would suffer if
he were constrained in making every decision by the consequences in terms of his own
potential liability in a suit for damages.”).
194
See Droscha v. Shepherd, 931 N.E.2d 882, 889 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“The underlying
purpose of the immunity is to preserve judicial independence in the decision-making
process.”).
195
For example, Rule 3.3 of the CJC prohibits a judge from testifying as a character
witness in a judicial, administrative, or other adjudicatory proceeding. MODEL CODE OF
JUDICIAL CONDUCT r. 3.3. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). The primary concern with this
prohibition if abuse of the prestige of the judicial office. Id. cmt. [1]. While there might be
valid concerns about, for example, an assistant district attorney testifying as a character
witness on behalf of another, the concerns do not seem to be pronounced enough to make
doing so a disciplinable offense.
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B. Potential Objections
Imposing a duty on prosecutors to avoid extra-prosecutorial conduct
that calls into question a prosecutor’s impartiality would likely raise
concerns from some quarters. As discussed below, the history surrounding
the passage of ABA Model Rule 8.4(g), the rule prohibiting a lawyer from
engaging in conduct the lawyer knows or should know is harassment or
discrimination on the basis of race and other traits, suggests that some
members of the bar--perhaps including some prosecutors--would likely
object to the adoption of the rule. But there are also some strong responses
to the anticipated objections.
1.

Objections

Rule 8.4(g) has been the subject of intense criticism in some
quarters.196 Since the ABA adopted Model Rule 8.4(g) in 2016, several
states have adopted the rule in its entirety or in similar form, but the
attorneys general in at least four states have raised constitutional objections
to the rule.197 The criticisms surrounding Rule 8.4(g) suggest several
possible lines of attack against a special rule concerning prosecutor bias.
Rule 8.4(g), like so many other issues in today’s society, has become a
flashpoint in today’s ongoing culture wars. The rule has been portrayed by
some as the legal profession’s version of “cancel culture.”198 The primary
196
See; Josh Blackman, Reply: A Pause for State Courts Considering Model Rule 8.4(g),
30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 241, 242 (2017) (raising First Amendment concerns over the
rule); ); Dennis Rendleman, The Crusade Against Model Rule 8.4(g), YOUR ABA (Oct.
2018) (discussing criticisms of the rule),
https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/publications/youraba/2018/october-2018/thecrusade-against-model-rule-8-4-g-/.
197
See Josh Blackman, ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) in the States, 68 CATH. U. L. R. 629, 630-33
(2019) (discussing opposition by attorneys general in Texas, Louisiana, South Carolina,
and Tennessee); N.M. Adopts Anti-Bias Rule Based on Controversial ABA Standard,
BLOOMBERG L., (Oct. 19, 2019 3:13 PM) (noting the adoption by New Mexico, Maine,
Missouri, and Colorado), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/new-mexicoadopts-anti-bias-rule-based-on-controversial-aba-rule Pennsylvania has adopted a similar
version of the rule. See Debra Cassens Weins, Suit Claims Anti-Bias Ethics Rule Infringes
Lawyer's Free Speech Rights, ABA J., (Aug. 11, 2020, 3:23 PM.) (noting Pennsylvania’s
adoption and a subsequent legal challenge to the rule),
https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/suit-claims-anti-bias-ethics-rule-infringeslawyers-free-speech-rights.
198
Mark DuBois, Rule 8.4(g): About Time or Unconstitutional Cancel Culture?, CONN. L.
TRIB. (Aug. 20, 2020, 12:42 PM) (noting free speech objections to the rule),
https://www.law.com/ctlawtribune/2020/08/20/rule-8-4g-about-time-or-unconstitutionalcancel-culture/; Rendleman, supra note 197 (stating that the rule “has been sucked into the
national partisan political morass”).
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criticisms of Rule 8.4(g) involve overbreadth and vagueness, both in the
practical and constitutional senses of the terms.199
In terms of overbreadth arguments, the rule prohibits discriminatory
conduct not just on the basis of race, sex, and other characteristics that the
law has long addressed but also on the basis of characteristics (such as
marital status and socioeconomic status) that are not often the subject of
state or federal anti-discrimination statutes.200 The inclusion of some of the
traits in this latter category has triggered overbreadth criticisms.201 In
addition, the rule is not limited to discriminatory conduct occurring in the
course of the representation of a client or even in a lawyer’s professional
capacity. Instead, the rule prohibits discriminatory conduct “related to the
law.”202 This includes interacting with co-workers and “participating in bar
association, business or social activities in connection with the practice of
law.”203 For critics, the extension of the rule in this manner represents an
unjustified “incursion into the private spheres of an attorney’s professional
life.”204
The rule has also generated criticisms over its supposed vagueness.205
Critics have complained about the failure of the drafters to define key terms,
such as “discrimination,” “harassment,” “socioeconomic status,” and
“legitimate” advocacy.”206 As a result, they charge, the rule may have a
chilling effect on lawyers’ willingness to discuss controversial topics or
express unpopular opinions.207
199

See Margaret Tarkington, Throwing Out the Baby: The ABA’s Subversion of Lawyer
First Amendment Rights, 24 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 41, 43 (2019) (stating that the rule is
“fraught with First Amendment problems”).
200
MODEL RULE 8.4(g).
201
See David L. Hudson, Jr., States Split on New ABA Model Rule Limiting Harassing or
Discriminatory Conduct, ABA J., (Oct. 1, 2017, 2:30 AM) (noting criticism of inclusion of
“socioeconomic status” in the rule); Tennessee Attorney General, Comment Letter
Opposing Proposed Amended Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(g) (stating that the rule
covers a “a significant amount of speech and conduct that is not currently prohibited under
federal or Tennessee antidiscrimination statutes”),
https://www.tn.gov/content/dam/tn/attorneygeneral/documents/foi/rule84g/comments-3-162018.pdf.
202
MODEL RULE 8.4(g).
203
Id. r. 8.4 cmt. [4].
204
Blackman, supra note 196, at 257.
205
See ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 493 (2020)
(noting vagueness concerns); Andrew Halaby & Brianna L. Long, New Model Rule of
Professional Conduct 8.4(g): Legislative History, Enforceability Questions, and a Call for
Scholarship, 41 J. LEG. PROF. 201, 236–41(2017) (raising vagueness concerns).
206
See Halaby & Long, supra note 205, at 236-37.
207
See Michael S. McGinnis, Expressing Conscience with Candor: Saint Thomas Moore
and First Freedoms in the Legal Profession, 42 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 173, 217 (2019)
(noting concerns expressed by opponents).
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A recent case from Pennsylvania highlights some of the obstacles that
amending the rules of professional conduct to add a rule addressing
prosecutor bias might face. In December 2020, a federal court in
Pennsylvania enjoined the enforcement of Pennsylvania’s version of the
rule on First Amendment grounds in Greenberg v. Haggerty.208 On its face,
Pennsylvania’s version of Rule 8.4(g) would seem to be narrower than
ABA Model Rule 8.4(g) insofar as it only addresses a lawyer’s conduct
occurring “in the practice of law” as opposed to conduct “related to the
law.”209 But a comment to the Pennsylvania rule explains that, like the
Model Rule, the Pennsylvania rule applies to “participation in activities that
are required for a lawyer to practice law,” including continuing legal
education events.210 The language of Pennsylvania’s rule borrows not only
from Model Rule 8.4(g) but from Rule 2.3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct.211 So, in addition to prohibiting discriminatory or harassing
speech or conduct, the rule prohibits a lawyer from “knowingly
manifest[ing] bias or prejudice” on the basis of race and other
characteristics.”212
The plaintiff in Greenberg was a lawyer who presented on hate speech
cases among other issues at continuing legal education programs.213 While
presenting, the plaintiff would quote the speech at issue, which would
sometimes contain offensive language or epithets.214 He expressed the
concern that in accurately quoting language from and expressing his
opinions on these cases, he ran the risk that audience members would
perceive his speech as manifesting bias or prejudice and that he might
potentially face disciplinary action under Rule 8.4(g).215
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania held that Pennsylvania’s Rule 8.4(g) amounted to
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.216 The court took issue with
various aspects of the rule, including the fact that the rule restricts speech
“outside of the courtroom, outside of the context of a pending case, and
even outside the much broader playing field of ‘administration of
justice.’”217 The court was also troubled by what it saw as the lack of clear
standards concerning what conduct would qualify as manifesting bias or
208

Greenberg v. Haggerty, No. 20-3822, 2020 WL 7227251, *8 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 8, 2020).
PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g).
210
Id. r. 8.4 cmt. [3].
211
See Greenberg, 2020 WL 7227251 at *6.
212
PA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.4(g).
213
Greenberg, 2020 WL 7227251 at *6
214
Id. at *6.
215
Id.
216
Id. at *15.
217
Id.
209
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prejudice. In the court’s view, the rule would chill constitutionally
protected speech and force lawyers to “scour every nook and cranny of each
ordinance, rule, and law in the Nation” for guidance as to what conduct is
prohibited.218
Given the polarized nature of debate in the U.S. on the issues of race,
gender identity, and religion (among other topics), opposition to a rule of
professional conduct that limits prosecutor speech or conduct involving
these topics unrelated to the practice of law is foreseeable, if not guaranteed.
Critics will undoubtedly cite the same irony that the Greenberg court
perceived, namely that “attorneys, those who are most educated and
encouraged to engage in dialogues about our freedoms, are the very ones
here who are forced to limit their words . . . .”219 In short, any addition to
the rules of professional conduct addressing prosecutor bias is likely to
generate at least some pushback.
2.

Responses

Whatever the strength of the arguments may be against subjecting all
lawyers to potential discipline for engaging in speech or conduct that
manifests bias, the arguments are considerably weaker when the
disciplinary rule in question applies only to prosecutors. Trying to make
sense of First Amendment law as it applies to lawyers and judges is a
daunting task, and it is (blessedly) not the purpose of this Article to engage
in a deep dive into all of the First Amendment implications of possible
regulation of prosecutors’ extra-judicial speech.220 Complicating the task in
this instance is that there are relatively few judicial discipline cases
involving First Amendment challenges outside of the judicial election
context, and prosecutor discipline cases involving First Amendment
challenges are hen’s teeth rare. But the existing caselaw involving First
Amendment challenges to regulation of judicial conduct does provide some
useful guidance.
1.

Strict Scrutiny Analysis

218

Id.
Id. at * 15.
220
See Rebecca Aviel, Rule 8.4(g) and the First Amendment: Distinguishing Between
Discrimination and Free Speech, 31 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 32 (2018) (noting the
“erratic quality” of decisions in the area and stating that that it is “difficult if not impossible
to develop a coherent paradigm for assessing when the bar can restrict or prohibit lawyer
speech”).
219
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One theme that emerges from the decisional law is that the state has
greater ability to regulate the expressive conduct of lawyers and judges than
it does in other areas.221 As Professor Rodney Smolla has observed, “[t]he
restrictions commonly placed on the expressive rights of judges and lawyers
would thus almost certainly be struck down under the First Amendment if
the general marketplace rules were applied.”222 The state’s ability to restrict
expressive conduct on the part of judges, in particular, is undoubtedly at its
zenith when the restriction involves the performance of judicial functions.
For example, Professor Smolla observes that CJC Rule 2.3(B)’s prohibition
on the manifestation of bias in the performance of judicial duties would face
no serious First Amendment challenge under generally-applicable First
Amendment tests, let alone under the more permissive approach that applies
in the case of lawyers and judges.223
A restriction on a judge’s expressive conduct outside the context of the
performance of judicial duties is likely to face strict scrutiny.224 But another
theme that emerges from the decisional law in the area is that the state has
compelling interests in protecting the appearance of judicial impartiality,
integrity, and independence as well as maintaining actual impartiality,
integrity, and independence.225 The 2015 Supreme Court decision of
221

Professor Rebecca Aviel has cataloged some of the situations in which courts have held
that the First Amendment does not prevent the state from restricting lawyer speech:
For better or for worse, the First Amendment that guides this discussion is the
same one that has allowed lawyers to be sanctioned for writing letters to accident
victims, criticizing judges, or soliciting campaign contributions for judicial
elections. Over First Amendment objections, lawyers have been held civilly liable
for refusing partnership to women, potentially subject to criminal liability for
providing advice to clients about pursuing claims in front of international
tribunals, and excluded from the practice of law altogether for espousing white
supremacy.
Id. at 36-37.
222
Rodney A. Smolla, Regulating the Speech of Judges and Lawyers: The First
Amendment and the Soul of the Profession, 66 FLA. L. REV. 961, 965 (2014).
223
Id. at 970-71; see also In re Neely, 390 P.3d 728 (Wyo. 2017) (upholding
constitutionality of Rule 2.3(B)).
224
See Griffen v. Ark. Judicial Discipline and Disability Comm'n, 130 S.W.3d 524, 535-36
(Ark. 2003) (stating it was “crystal clear” that strict scrutiny review applied to rule
prohibiting judges from appearing at a public hearing before a legislative body except on
matters concerning the law, the legal system or the administration of justice or except when
acting pro se in a matter involving the judge or the judge's interests).
225
See Platt v. Board of Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline of Ohio Sup. Ct., 894 F.3d
235, 254 (6th Cir. 2018) (stating that “maintaining judges’ actual independence and
impartiality, and maintaining the public’s trust in the judiciary’s independence and
impartiality” are both compelling interests); French v. Jones, 876 F.3d 1228, 1237 (9th Cir.
2017) (holding state has a compelling state interest “in both actual and perceived
impartiality”); Guffey v. Duff, 459 F.Supp.3d 227, 232 (D.D.C. 2020) (recognizing state’s
interest in protecting the appearance of judicial integrity and impartiality to be compelling);
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Williams-Yulee v. Florida Bar provides the clearest example of this
principle.226
Williams-Yulee involved a First Amendment challenge to Florida’s
judicial conduct rule prohibiting judges from personally soliciting campaign
funds.227 The case does not involve the type of purely personal speech
having no direct connection to the judicial office discussed in this Article.
But neither is it an example of speech occurring as part of a judge’s official
duties where the state unquestionably has greater latitude in terms of the
restrictions it imposes. Instead, the Court applied heightened scrutiny given
the potential for the restriction to stifle speech closely related to matters of
public concern and democratic self-governance.228 As such, the case
illustrates the type of scrutiny that would likely apply to restrictions on
extra-judicial (or extra-prosecutorial) speech.
Florida’s stated concern in enforcing the restriction was that “personal
solicitations by judicial candidates create a public appearance that
undermines confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.”229 Drawing upon
the notion that “justice must satisfy the appearance of justice,” the Court
recognized this as a compelling state interest.230 The restriction was
narrowly tailored insofar as it permitted candidates for judicial office to
advertise their candidacies and discuss matters of public concerns through
other means, such as writing letters, giving speeches, putting up billboards,
and directing their campaigns to directly solicit contributions.231
Any rule regulating a prosecutor’s extra-prosecutorial conduct would
need to advance a compelling state interest and be narrowly tailored.
Williams-Yulee suggests that preserving the integrity and impartiality and
the appearance of integrity and impartiality of prosecutors should easily
qualify as compelling interests. Provided any restriction on extraprosecutorial speech is narrowly tailored, such restrictions should withstand
constitutional challenge.
2.

Vagueness Challenges

In addition, the Greenberg decision also suggests that any attempt to
regulate prosecutors’ extra-prosecutorial speech must be able to withstand a
Griffen, 120 S.W. 3d at 536 (stating that safeguarding an independent judiciary is a
compelling state interest).
226
575 U.S. 433 (2015).
227
Id. at 441.
228
See id. at 443.
229
Id. at 454.
230
Id. at 446 (quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954)).
231
See id. at 452.
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potential vagueness challenge.232 The decisions in the judicial context
suggest that reliance upon the language of the CJC may aid in that defense.
The standard that is most susceptible of vagueness criticism is the
“appearance of impropriety” standard. But even this standard has withstood
numerous vagueness challenges in the past.233 The Supreme Court’s
decision in Williams-Yulee suggests that a rule tethered to the values of
integrity and impartiality is even more likely to withstand a vagueness
challenge.234 The CJC defines both terms, thus reducing come concerns
over vagueness.235 And the terms “bias” and “prejudice,” which appear
both as part of the definition of “impartiality” and as part of other rules,
have been further defined by the Supreme Court in the context of judicial
disqualification decisions.236 More generally, there is a wealth of decisional
law in the judicial disqualification and discipline cases that help to flesh out
the contours of these concepts.237 First Amendment caselaw involving
lawyers and judges reveals that standards that might be impermissibly
vague in other contexts are enforceable when applied to lawyers given their
experience within the profession.238 Ultimately, the legal profession should
be able to draft rules regarding extra-prosecutorial conduct that are
sufficiently clear to withstand vagueness challenges.

232

Greenberg v. Haggerty, Civil Action No. 20-3822, 2020 WL 7227251, *1 (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 8, 2020) (noting plaintiff’s vagueness challenge).
233
See Moore, supra note 146, at 293-94 (noting that the clear majority of decisions have
upheld rules based on this standard against vagueness challenges).
234
See supra notes 226-231 and accompanying text; In re Neely, 390 P.3d 728, 746-47
(Wyo. 2017) (rejecting vagueness challenge to rule of judicial conduct designed to promote
values of judicial integrity and impartiality). It is also noteworthy that the terms “bias” and
“prejudice,” which appear in the CJC both as part of the definition of impropriety.
235
See supra notes 135-136 and accompanying text.
236
See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550 (1994) (stating the terms “connote a
favorable or unfavorable disposition or opinion that is somehow wrongful or inappropriate,
either because it is undeserved, or because it rests upon knowledge that the subject ought
not to possess ... or because it is excessive in degree”).
237
See Robertson, supra note 126, at 768 (noting decisions discussing the concepts). A
2016 Supreme Court decision actually discussed the issue of bias in a case involving a
prosecutor who had worked on a death penalty case and later became a judge who was
asked to rule on the individual’s habeas petition. Pennsylvania v. Williams, 136 S. Ct.
1899 (2016).
238
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626,
666 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Given the traditions of
the legal profession and an attorney's specialized professional training, there is
unquestionably some room for enforcement of standards that might be impermissibly
vague in other contexts; an attorney in many instances may properly be punished for
‘conduct which all responsible attorneys would recognize as improper for a member of the
profession.’”) (citations omitted).
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C. Amending the Rules of Professional Conduct
There remains the issue of how an amendment to the rules of
professional conduct should be structured in order to address the problem of
extra-prosecutorial conduct that raises concern over impartiality. There are
several possible approaches a jurisdiction might take. The following
section explores the various options, proceeding in order of least promising
to most promising.
1. Adding an Updated Version of DR 1-102(A)(6)
One possibility would be to enact a rule based on prior DR 1102(A)(6), which prohibits a lawyer from engaging in conduct that
adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice law..239 This would be
unwise, however. The concerns over vagueness involving this standard are
even more pronounced than they are in the case of Rule 8.4(g) in terms of
what conduct the rule prohibits.240 Such a rule would likely be met with
widespread opposition.
2.

Reinterpreting Model Rule 8.4(d) or Creating A Prosecutor-Specific
Version of the Rule

Another possibility would be for jurisdictions to interpret Model Rule
8.4(d), which prohibits conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice,241 as reaching discriminatory words or conduct occurring outside a
lawyer’s professional capacity. One concern with this approach is that it
would require courts to overrule prior precedent defining the scope of the
rule. The fact that a prosecutor’s professional judgment is influenced or
appears to be influenced by impermissible biases as evidenced by the
prosecutor’s extra-prosecutorial speech certainly interferes with the
administration of justice in the sense that it may cause the public to doubt
that justice is being done when a particular prosecutor is involved. But, as
discussed, the vast majority of courts have interpreted the rule to require
that the misconduct have some bearing on the judicial process in connection
with an identifiable case or tribunal.242 Unless the extra-prosecutorial
239

See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text and accompanying text.
See Stephen Gillers, A Rule to Forbid Bias and Harassment in Law Practice: A Guide
for State Courts Considering Model Rule 8.4(g), 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 195, 216 n.80
(2017) (“The ‘adversely reflects’ rule offers much less guidance on the forbidden conduct
than does Rule 8.4(g).”).
241
See supra notes 55-80 and accompanying text.
242
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
240
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conduct involves an ongoing matter, the rule would not apply under the
majority approach.243 Interpreting the rule to reach, for example, a
prosecutor’s generalized anti-Muslim tweets would require the
overwhelming majority of jurisdictions to reverse their prior interpretations
of the rule. However, such a change might not be as radical as it might first
appear. As discussed, federal judges and many state judges are already
subject to essentially the same standard, which has been applied to
extrajudicial conduct unrelated to any ongoing matter.244 Applying the
same standard to prosecutors would be consistent with existing law in this
respect.
The other concern with applying the “prejudicial to the administration
of justice” standard to extra-prosecutorial speech is the likelihood of
opposition from prosecutors and First Amendment challenges. The rule has
previously withstood constitutional challenges on vagueness and
overbreadth grounds,245 but courts and commentators have expressed
concern over the reach and potential vagueness of the “prejudicial to the
administration of justice” standard.246 The vagueness and overbreadth
concerns may take on greater weight when the standard is applied to speech
having no direct relation to an ongoing matter. The concerns over the
potential chilling effect of the rule on speech are likely to be most
pronounced in those borderline instances in which a prosecutor’s
extrajudicial statements are not overtly racist.
If a jurisdiction wanted to adopt a prosecutor-specific rule dealing with
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, the logical place to
include such a rule would be within Rule 3.8, the rule devoted to the special
responsibilities of prosecutors. Logically, any lawyer – a prosecutor, a
criminal defense, or civil lawyer – could commit a violation of the rule
through biased social media postings or other extra-prosecutorial speech
under the revised approach. But as discussed, the state has a stronger
interest in imposing special duties upon prosecutors than other types of
attorneys, so a special application of the rule that applies to prosecutors
243

See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 176-179 and accompanying text.
245
See Howell v. State Bar, 843 F.2d 205, 208 (5th Cir. 1988).
246
See Matter of the Discipline of Two Attorneys, 660 N.E.2d 1093, 1099 (Mass. 1996)
(stating that the broad language of the rule “presents the risk of vagueness and arbitrary
application” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Grievance Adm'r v. Fried, 570 N.W.2d
262, 265 (Mich. 1997) (per curiam) (noting that application of such a “broad rule” requires
caution); Bruce A. Green, Lawyers’ Professional Independence: Overrated or
Undervalued, 46 AKRON L. REV. 599, 627 (2013) (referring to Rule 8.4(d) as “a vague
catch-all rule”); Noah D. Stein, Note, Prosecutorial Ethics and the McNulty Memo: Should
the Government Scrutinize an Organization's Payment of its Employees' Attorneys' Fees?,
75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3245, 3261 (2007) (noting vagueness concerns).
244
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might be justified more easily.247 Therefore, if a jurisdiction were to adopt
a prosecutor-specific version of Rule 8.4(d), it should be included as a part
of Rule 3.8.
3.

Adding a “Manifestation of Bias” Standard

A jurisdiction might also consider adding a version of CJC Rule 2.3(B)
to its rules of professional conduct governing lawyers, thereby prohibiting a
prosecutor from manifesting bias or prejudice in the performance of
prosecutorial duties.248 In order to address the problem of extraprosecutorial speech, however, the language of the rule would need to be
amended because, on its face, the rule only addresses conducting occurring
in the performance of prosecutorial duties. 249 Pennsylvania took a similar
approach in its rules by adding language from CJC Rule 2.3(B) to its
version of Rule 8.4(g); this, of course, led to the suit in Greenberg.250 The
fact that this “manifestation of bias” language has been the subject of a
successful constitutional challenge suggests that the adoption of such a rule
would be met with some opposition and potential litigation. While there are
valid arguments in response to the constitutional objections, another
concern is that the rule might not address the situation in which a prosecutor
makes a statement that is not overtly racist but nonetheless calls into
question the prosecutor’s understanding of the special role of a prosecutor.
For example, a rule for prosecutors based on Rule 2.3(B) probably would
not apply to the prosecutor who, as discussed in the Introduction, posted a
suggestion on social media that law enforcement shoot protesters.251
Therefore, while such a rule might address the worst types of biased public
statements by prosecutors, it would not, standing alone, address other
statements that call into question the prosecutor’s integrity or fitness for
office.
4. Adding an Appearance of Impropriety Standard
Another means of addressing a prosecutor’s extra-prosecutorial speech
that manifests racial bias or that otherwise calls into question a prosecutor’s
fitness would be to add an “appearance of impropriety” rule--like the one in

247

See supra notes 221-231 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 161-162 and accompanying text.
249
See In re Neely, 390 P.3d 728, 760-62 (Wyo. 2017) (Kautz, J., dissenting) (arguing that
Rules 2.2 and 2.3 only apply to actions occurring within the context of a particular matter).
250
See supra notes 208-218 and accompanying text.
251
See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
248
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the CJC252--to Model Rule 3.8, the rule regarding a prosecutor’s
responsibilities. The CJC’s appearance of impropriety standard has been
attacked for its vagueness and lack of clear standards.253 The standard has
been decried as being “unbelievably ambiguous”254 and “the poster child of
statutory imprecision.”255 Underlying these concerns is the somewhat
subjective nature of the term; as explained by one judge, “Propriety . . . . is
often in the eye of the beholder.”256 As a result, critics charge, judges may
not know when their conduct crosses the line, and it becomes too easy for
any aggrieved individual or enemy to allege a violation of the rule.257
Indeed, the criticism concerning the standard was substantial enough that
the ABA Joint Commission to Evaluate the Model Judicial Code went back
and forth several times on the question of whether the “appearance of
impropriety” standard should be included as a black-letter rule in the
CJC.258 Ultimately, the ABA approved the current version of the CJC,
which includes both Canon 1 (“A Judge Shall Uphold and Promote the
Independence, Integrity, and the Impartiality of the Judiciary, and Shall
Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety”) as well as Rule
1.2, which provides that “[a] judge shall act at all times in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the independence, integrity, and impartiality
of the judiciary, and shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of
impropriety.”259
The “appearance of impropriety” standard has also appeared in ethics
rules governing lawyers before being jettisoned over vagueness concerns.
Canon 9 of the older Model Code of Professional Responsibility instructed
lawyers to avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.260 While
the accompanying Disciplinary Rule 9-101 was titled “Avoiding Even the
252

See supra notes 143-160 and accompanying text.
See Cynthia Gray, Avoiding the Appearance of Impropriety: With Great Power Comes
Great Responsibility, 28 UALR L. REV. 63, 93 (2005) (noting the vagueness criticisms of
the standard); Raymond J. McKoski, Judicial Discipline and the Appearance of
Impropriety: What the Public Sees Is What the Judge Gets, 94 MINN. L. REV. 1914, 1936
(2010) (noting concerns that the standard may be so vague as to violate due process);
Ronald D. Rotunda, Judicial Ethics, the Appearance of Impropriety, and the Proposed New
ABA Judicial Code, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1337, 1339 (2006) (noting that the term has not
been defined with any precision).
254
Gray, supra note 253, at 93 n.187 (quoting Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg).
255
McKoski, supra note 253, at 1936.
256
In re Larsen, 616 A.2d 529, 580-81 (Pa. 1992) (per curiam).
257
See Rotunda, supra note 253, at 1338 (“Unnecessarily imprecise ethics rules allow and
tempt critics, with minimum effort, to levy a plausible and serious charge that the judge has
violated the ethics rules.”).
258
See Moore, supra note 146, at 285-87 (discussing the history of the provision).
259
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 1 (AM BAR ASS’N 2010); id. r. 1.2.
260
MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9 (AM BAR ASS’N 1969).
253
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Appearance of Impropriety,” the language of the rule itself did not use this
language or specifically prohibit conduct that resulted in the appearance of
impropriety.261 Instead, the “appearance of impropriety” standard was most
frequently invoked in in disqualification motions.262 Where an attorney’s
continued representation of a client might damage the public’s trust, the
representation would result in the appearance of impropriety and
disqualification was appropriate.263 But concerns over the subjectivity and
vagueness of the standard ultimately led the drafters of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct to omit the “appearance of impropriety” standard.264
Given the “appearance of impropriety” standard’s somewhat shady
reputation, one can foresee organized opposition to the inclusion of such a
standard in the rules of professional conduct governing lawyers. But there
are arguments on the other side as well. There is a good argument that the
concerns over the vagueness of standard are overstated, at least as applied to
cases decided under the Code of Judicial Conduct.265 Judicial conduct
commissions and reviewing courts have generally limited application of the
standard to situations involving fairly egregious judicial conduct.266 In
addition, the CJC defines the concept by reference to the ideas of
independence, integrity, and impartiality, which, in turn, have their own

261

Id. DR 9-101. The accompanying disciplinary rules prohibited such conduct as
accepting private employment in a matter upon the merits of which the lawyer acted in a
judicial capacity or had substantial responsibility as a public employee, implying the ability
to influence a public official, and improperly safeguarding client funds. Id. DR 9-101, 102.
262
See Flowers, supra note 277, at 14 (noting that some courts used Canon 9 as a basis for
disqualifying attorneys); David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics
Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 44 (1995) (“Canon 9, in particular,
which enjoins lawyers to avoid even the appearance of impropriety, was often quoted in
conjunction with conflict of interest rules to tip borderline cases, despite the fact that its
language is not duplicated [in the disciplinary rules].”).
263
Flowers, supra note 27, at 713-16 (discussing use of the standard in the disqualification
context).
264
See Flowers, supra note 27, at 717; see also Bruce A. Green, Conflicts of Interest in
Legal Representation: Should the Appearance of Impropriety Rule Be Eliminated in New
Jersey—or Revived Everywhere Else?, 28 SETON HALL L. REV. 315, 332-33(1997)
(discussing the decision to omit the standard from the AB’s Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.)
265
See Gray, supra note 253, at 93-95 (discussing successful defenses of the standard in the
face of vagueness challenges); Moore, supra note 139, at 295–96 (dismissing criticism that
the rule may be applied “on a whim”).
266
Moore, supra note 146, at 296 (noting that in most instances, the conduct in question
“was, at best, highly questionable”); see also Gray, supra note 253, at 65 (“[J]udicial
discipline authorities are not using the standard as an arbitrary smell test but are applying it
in a cautious, reasoned, and appropriate manner with no evidence of overly subjective
interpretation.”).
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definitions. 267 These definitions reduce some of the uncertainty associated
with the standard.
Moreover, requiring prosecutors to abide by an “appearance of
impropriety” standard is not a new concept.268 The ABA Criminal Justice
Standards for the Prosecution Function already provides that a prosecutor
“[s]hould avoid an appearance of impropriety in performing the prosecution
function.”269 The new wrinkles would be making this obligation mandatory
as opposed to aspirational and having it apply to extra-prosecutorial conduct
as well as conduct occurring during the prosecution function.
5. Adding a Version of CJC Rule 3.1(C)
Perhaps the most practical approach to the specific problem of extraprosecutorial speech that involves racial and other forms of bias or that
otherwise calls into question the prosecutor’s fitness for office would be to
add a new paragraph to the rule of conduct covering prosecutors that is
based on Rule 3.1 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.270
Rule 3.8: Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor
…
(B) A prosecutor shall conduct the prosecutor’s personal and
extra-prosecutorial activities to minimize the risk of conflict with
the obligations of the prosecutor’s office. When engaging in
extra-prosecutorial activities, a prosecutor shall not:
(i) participate in activities that will interfere with the proper
performance of the prosecutor’s official duties;
(ii) participate in activities that will lead to frequent
disqualification of the prosecutor;

267

See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
See Flowers, supra note 27, at 736 (arguing in favor of adding an appearance of
impropriety standard to Model Rule 3.8).
269
AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 31.2(c) (4th ed. 2017).
270
See supra notes 169-172 and accompanying text.
268
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(iii) participate in activities that would appear to a reasonable
person to undermine the prosecutor’s independence, integrity, or
impartiality.271
This rule would address the specific problem of racist or similarly
offensive online speech as well as other forms of extra-prosecutorial
conflict that might lead to reasonable questions concerning a prosecutor’s
professional judgment and ability to carry out the obligations of the office
with integrity and impartiality. The restriction is narrowly tailored insofar
as it permits prosecutors to discuss or even announce their views on matter
of public concern, provided their actions do not raise reasonable concerns
about their independence, integrity, or impartiality. Any concerns about
clarity of language could be addressed by borrowing the definitions of
“independence,” “integrity,” and “impartiality” from the CJC and the
accompanying comments to the rule.272 The wealth of disciplinary and
judicial decisions involving these concepts would also be relevant in
determining when a prosecutor’s conduct amounts to a violation.
Judicial ethics opinions may also provide greater clarity and guidance
concerning when extra-prosecutorial speech and activity on social media in
particular may violate the rule. Judicial ethics opinions on the subject make
clear that the rule prohibits a judge from “liking” a friend’s demeaning or
offensive posts.273
Reposting a Facebook friend’s discriminatory
communication might also amount to the sort of endorsement that violates
the rule.274 A California opinion explains that a judge has an obligation
under the rule to delete “or otherwise repudiate demeaning or offensive
comments made by others that appear on the judge’s social networking
site.275
271

Adding this provision would require reorganizing the existing version of Rule 3.8. The
language in the text accompanying this note is provided as an example of how the rule
might be restructured.
272
MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Terminology (AM. BAR ASS’N 2010). See
generally Rotunda, supra note 231, at 1340 (“[F]or all its problems, the test of ‘impartiality
might reasonably be questioned’ is not as troublesome as is the even more formless,
‘appearance of impropriety.’”).
273
See Mass Comm. on Judicial Ethics Op. No. 2016-01 (2016),
https://www.mass.gov/opinion/cje-opinion-no-2016-01; Mo. Comm. on Ret., Removal and
Discipline Op. 186 (2015) (on file with author).
274
See Mass. Comm. on Judicial Ethics Op. No. 2016-01 (2016),
https://www.mass.gov/opinion/cje-opinion-no-2016-01
275
Ca. Judges Ass’, Judicial Ethics Op. 66,
https://www.caljudges.org/docs/Ethics%20Opinions/Op%2066%20Final.pdf. Some
opinions advise that if a judge becomes aware of discriminatory content on a friend’s social
media site, the judge must stop "liking" or "following" that individual, lest the judge’s
failure to act be construed as an endorsement of that individual’s views that would
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CONCLUSION
This Article has devoted considerable time to anticipating objections to
the adoption of a new rule of conduct addressing extra-prosecutorial speech
and conduct that manifests bias on the basis of race and other
characteristics. But it is worth noting that individual prosecutors’ offices
might also adopt their own internal ethics codes.
For example,
Connecticut’s Division of Criminal Justice has adopted its own ethics
policy, which begins by announcing that employees of the Division “shall
act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the
independence, integrity, and impartiality of the Division of Criminal Justice
and the State of Connecticut’s Criminal Justice system.”276 One rule within
the policy adopts an “appearance of impropriety” rule, prohibiting
employees from engaging in any personal or professional activity that
creates the reasonable appearance of impropriety or conflict with the proper
discharge of his or her duties or employment in the public interest.277
Another discusses activities outside of an employee’s official duties and
borrows language from Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, including
the language from Rule 3.1(C) prohibiting a judge from participating in
activities that would appear to a reasonable person to undermine the
employee’s independence, integrity, or impartiality.278
At least until more prosecutor offices adopt such policies, the legal
profession should formally do so. The CJC provides some examples of
possible approaches that might be tailored in order to withstand a First
Amendment challenge. But ultimately, the failure of the legal profession to
adopt such an approach may cause an increased lack of faith in the criminal
justice system.
One final example from the judicial realm provides an illustration of
the need for such a rule. Mississippi Commission on Judicial Performance
v. Wilkerson is a 2004 decision from Mississippi.279 In Wilkerson,
negatively influence the integrity or impartiality of the judiciary. Mass. Comm.on Judicial
Ethics Op. No. 2016-01 (2016), https://www.mass.gov/opinion/cje-opinion-no-2016-01;
Mo. Comm. on Rwt., Removal and Discipline Opinion 186 (2015).
276
State of Conn. Div. of Criminal Justice, Admin. Policies and Procedures, Office of the
Chief State’s Attorney, Policy No, 106, https://portal.ct.gov//media/Ethics/Ethics_Policies/2019-2020/Division-of-Criminal-Justice-Ethics-Policy2019.pdf?la=en; https://portal.ct.gov//media/DCJ/Division_of_Criminal_Justice_Ethics_Policy.pdf
277
Id.
278
Id.
279
876 So. 2d 1006 (Miss. 2004).
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Mississippi’s judicial conduct commission concluded that a justice of the
peace had violated the state’s rule of judicial conduct prohibiting a judge
from engaging in extrajudicial conduct that casts reasonable doubt on the
judge’s ability to act impartially as a judge.280 The commission reached this
conclusion after the justice of the peace wrote a letter to the editor of a local
paper complaining about the fact that some states had permitted same-sex
partners to sue in a capacity traditionally only afforded to spouses.
Specifically, the justice of the peace wrote, “[i]n my opinion, gays and
lesbians should be put in some type of mental institute instead of having a
law like this passed for them . . . .”281 The Mississippi Supreme Court held
that while the state had a compelling interest in preserving the impartiality
of the judiciary, it did not have a compelling interest in preserving the
appearance of impartiality.282 In reaching this decision, the court referenced
“an old Malayan proverb which states: ‘Don't think there are no crocodiles
because the water is calm.’”283 According to the court, the state should be
preserving the impartiality of the bench by helping “citizens to spot the
crocodiles” by letting biased judges speak rather than creating the
appearance that there are no crocodiles.284
Whatever one’s views are on the relative merits of crocodiles and
crocodile-spotting, a reasonable person knows that crocodiles are
dangerous. And a reasonable person might also assume that where there is
one crocodile, there may be more. At that point, a reasonable person might
lose all faith that the water is reasonably safe and simply avoid going
anywhere near the water altogether. That is not something the criminal
justice can afford to let happen. Perhaps the better approach is to announce
to potential visitors that crocodiles are dangerous, are not welcome in these
waters, and will be dealt with should they appear.

280

Id. at 1009-10.
Id. at 1009.
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Id. at 1015.
283
Id. at 1016.
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